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DIGITAL SWITZERLANDS

KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR†
U.S. technology companies are increasingly standing as competing power centers that
challenge the primacy of governments. This power brings with it the capacity to bolster or
undermine governmental authority, as well as increasing public demands for the companies
to protect users from governments. The companies’ power raises serious questions about how
to understand their role. Scholars have proposed varying conceptions, suggesting that the
companies should be understood as public utilities, information fiduciaries, surveillance
intermediaries, or speech governors. This Article takes up another possibility, one suggested
by the companies themselves: that they are “Digital Switzerlands.”
The Digital Switzerlands concept encompasses two ideas: (1) that the companies
are on par with, not subordinate to, the countries that try to regulate them, and (2)
that they are, in some sense, neutral. This Article critically evaluates the plausibility
of these claims and explores how the companies differ from other powerful private
parties. The Digital Switzerlands concept sheds light on why the companies have begun
to resist both the U.S. government and foreign governments, but it also means that the
companies do not always counter governments. Understanding the relationship
between companies, users, and governments as triangular, not purely hierarchical,
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reveals how alliances among them affect the companies’ behavior toward governments.
But the companies’ efforts to maintain a posture of neutrality also carry a risk of
passivity that may allow governmental attacks on users to go unchallenged.
Turning to the normative, this Article proposes several considerations for assessing
the desirability of having companies be Digital Switzerlands. Does the rise of the
companies as competing power centers benefit individual users? Does the companies’
lack of democratic attributes render them illegitimate powers? If the companies claim
the benefits of the sovereign analogy, should they also be held to the public-law values
imposed on governments, and if so, how? And if there is value in the companies acting
as Digital Switzerlands, how can this role be entrenched to prevent backsliding? This
Article oﬀers preliminary answers to these questions, while acknowledging that the
answers may well evolve along with the companies’ behavior.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 666
I. THE PARALLEL EVOLUTION OF COMPETING POWERS ..............670
A. Governments and Cyberspace .........................................................671
B. Technology Companies and Cyberspace ........................................... 672
1. Countering Foreign Governments ...................................... 674
2. Countering All Governments—Sometimes ......................... 677
C. Distinguishing Other Powerful Private Parties ................................. 681
II. TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES AS DIGITAL SWITZERLANDS ...........685
A. Parity .......................................................................................... 685
B. Neutrality ....................................................................................696
C. The Scope and Limits of Digital Switzerlands.................................. 702
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF DIGITAL SWITZERLANDS ......... 712
A. Individuals’ Power and Freedom ..................................................... 712
B. Democracy and Accountability ........................................................ 715
C. Public-Law Values.........................................................................719
D. Stability and Sustainability.............................................................727
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 730
INTRODUCTION
In a recent speech, Microsoft President Brad Smith argued that
technology companies collectively need to become a “Digital Switzerland.”1
This striking claim put a label on the emerging reality that although
somewhat bounded by the laws of the countries in which they are
1 Brad Smith, President, Microsoft Corp., Keynote Address at the RSA Conference 2017: The
Need for a Digital Geneva Convention 12 (Feb. 14, 2017) (transcript available at
https://blogs.microsoft.com/uploads/2017/03/Transcript-of-Brad-Smiths-Keynote-Address-at-theRSA-Conference-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKB5-SCUF]).
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headquartered or operate, U.S. technology companies are increasingly
standing as competing power centers, challenging the primacy of
governments. This power brings with it signiﬁcant capacity to bolster or
undermine governmental authority and increasing public demands for the
companies to take action to protect users from governments. It has become
de rigueur to attack the companies for doing both too much and too little.2
Major U.S. technology companies in recent years have undergone a dramatic
evolution.3 Companies like Yahoo and Google were once—not terribly long
ago—criticized for complicity with foreign governments’ human rights abuses.
But since that time, the companies shifted first to challenging the actions and
policies of foreign governments. Then, in the wake of the Snowden disclosures,
they shifted again, expanding their mandate to countering all governments,
prominently including the United States, at least sometimes. The Digital
Switzerland idea embodies the latest, tentative step in the evolution—a shift from
simply blocking and checking governments to providing an affirmative theory of
the companies’ role in the digital ecosystem and in international affairs. To be sure,
these are not the first superempowered private parties, but they differ in some
salient ways from other powerful private actors, both historical and contemporary,
in ways that affect the feasibility of their claim to be Digital Switzerlands.4 They
2 See, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH
192 (2017) (“The threat of bigness posed by Amazon, Facebook, and Google is a threat to self-government.”);
K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public
Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1672 (2018) (“The threat that such private control poses
to our larger political, economic, and social life . . . arises from the increasingly essential status in
our internet economy, and the myriad of ways in which the platforms can be manipulated to operate
on unequal, discriminatory, or misleading terms.”); David Streitfeld, Tech Giants, Once Seen as
Saviors, Are Now Viewed as Threats, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
12/technology/tech-giants-threats.html (noting that the U.S. tech companies’ “amount of
concentrated authority resembles the divine right of kings, and is sparking a backlash that is still
gathering force”); Nitasha Tiku, How Big Tech Became a Bipartisan Whipping Boy, WIRED (Oct. 23,
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-big-tech-became-a-bipartisan-whipping-boy
[https://perma.cc/CN8P-9Y35] (“[C]alls to rein in Silicon Valley superpowers are coming from all
parts of the political spectrum, from people who agree on little else.”); Craig Timberg, Hamza
Shaban & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Fiery Exchanges on Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Scold Facebook, Google
and Twitter, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2017/11/01/fiery-exchanges-on-capitol-hill-as-lawmakers-scold-facebook-google-and-twitter [https://perma.cc/
4YJU-KA72] (quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein as saying, while remonstrating tech company
executives about their handling of Russian interference in the 2016 election, “You bear this
responsibility. You’ve created these platforms. And now they are being misused. And you have to be
the ones to do something about it. Or we will.”). But see Emily Parker, Opinion, Silicon Valley Can’t
Destroy Democracy Without Our Help, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/
opinion/silicon-valley-democracy-russia.html (“It has become popular to demonize Silicon Valley.”).
3 See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (discussing limitation to U.S. and Western
European companies).
4 See infra Section I.C. While Smith used “Digital Switzerland” singular, this Article uses “Digital
Switzerlands” plural in recognition of the fact that the tech companies are less like Swiss cantons, unified
in a single country, than like independent but similarly acting neutral states. Their differing business
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aspire to be global, not national. They have global users, not just customers or
shareholders. And they are attractive, not extractive, drawing on soft power
rather than hard power.
Embedded in the companies’ undoubtedly self-interested assertion of
Digital Switzerlands status are two claims. First, labeling technology
companies as “Digital Switzerlands” suggests that they are on par with, not
subordinate to, governments, including those governments that try to
regulate them. It is, in essence, the idea that they have become supplemental
sovereigns, governing individuals alongside states. Second, the choice of
Switzerland, out of all possible countries, as the companies’ analytic parallel
highlights that they aim to be, in some sense, neutral.
In useful ways, the Digital Switzerland analogy has purchase. On the
parity point, analogizing to Switzerland may be aiming low: the companies
have transnational reach, many have user bases rivaling the population of
China, and some have ﬁnancial resources that outstrip Switzerland itself, to
say nothing of less well-oﬀ countries. The companies also exhibit a mixture
of motives—interests versus ideals—that are on full display in states too. On
the goal of neutrality, some of the companies’ recent arguments in legal
proceedings and in public echo well-established principles from the
international law of neutrality, including that neutrals cannot diﬀerentially
support parties to a conﬂict and that parties to a conﬂict have an obligation
not to target or use facilities in neutral states.
But in other salient ways, the analogy runs out. Most obviously, the
companies lack territory, statehood, and sovereignty—key features of
countries. And countries by and large do not recognize the companies as
fellow Westphalian entities.5 Moreover, neutrality is a complicated posture.
Despite their eﬀorts to appear neutral, the companies remain strongly
associated with the United States, where they are headquartered, and subject
to compulsion wherever they operate. Their attempts to remain neutral also
carry with them a risk of passivity that can allow governmental attacks on
users to go unchallenged. Understanding the relationship between U.S.
technology companies, users, and governments as triangular, not purely
models and cultures lead to somewhat differing conceptions of neutrality and raise different issues. For
example, the controversy over Russian exploitation of social media networks and ad purchases has pulled
in Facebook, Twitter, and Google, see infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text, but not Apple, whose
business model doesn’t depend on targeted advertising in the same way. Interestingly, at least one report
indicates that Google previously used the idea of a “digital Switzerland” in a different context. See KEN
AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 5 (2009) (describing a meeting in
which Google CEO Eric Schmidt and cofounder Sergey Brin “explained that Google was a digital
Switzerland, a ‘neutral’ search engine that favored no content company and no advertisers” and whose
“search results were ‘objective,’ based on secret algorithms”).
5 But see infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text (discussing Denmark’s appointment of an
ambassador to the tech companies in Silicon Valley).
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hierarchical, however, helps to reveal how alliances among the three have
aﬀected and will continue to aﬀect the companies’ behavior toward
governments. Neutrality is a role into which the companies are still growing,
while continuing to make signiﬁcant missteps along the way.
This Article proposes key criteria to consider in assessing the desirability of
companies serving as Digital Switzerlands and offers preliminary conclusions.
First, the rise of the technology companies as competing power centers,
challenging established sovereigns, could be construed as a positive development
for individual users. The companies are a powerful force capable of challenging
governmental Leviathans. Yet the companies are also another layer of power over
individuals. Are individuals better or worse off as a result of the companies’ role?
The answer will depend on one’s view of the relative prevalence of the companies’
roles as regulator and shield, as well as one’s level of concern about governments.
Second, the companies as supplemental sovereigns over individuals are
not democratic. Users who are not shareholders lack governance rights, and
it is nearly impossible for an individual not to pledge fealty to one (or more)
of the technology companies. On the other hand, the allegiance is chosen, not
assigned by birth, like citizenship, and it is changeable at the user’s discretion
(though not without considerable inconvenience). Is control via limited exit
options enough to redeem a lack of democratic rights?
Third, if companies hold themselves out as “Digital Switzerlands,” capable
of and indeed engaged in public functions, should they be held to the public-law
values imposed on governments—values like accountability, transparency, due
process, and the protection of privacy and security? If so, how?
Finally, the companies have shifted from colluding with to countering
governments at least some of the time—and they could easily switch back. If
there is value in the companies acting as Digital Switzerlands, how can this
role be entrenched?
To be clear, this Article primarily addresses the companies’ relationships
to governments. It does not focus on the many signiﬁcant issues surrounding
technology companies’ relationships with their users in general,6 though as
6 These issues are myriad, including, for example, the companies’ appropriate role in content
moderation, the extent to which platforms are discriminatory, transparency to users about how the
companies use and sell their data, the eﬀect of social media on society, and whether the companies
should be reined in by antitrust laws. See, e.g., FOER, supra note 2, at 203-04 (“The health of our
democracy demands that we consider treating Facebook, Google, and Amazon with the same firm hand
that led government to wage war on AT&T, IBM, and Microsoft—even dismembering them into
smaller companies if circumstances (and the law) demand a forceful response.”); Anupam Chander
& Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of Platform Neutrality, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 400, 413-15 (2018)
(discussing conservative critiques of platforms as biased); Rahman, supra note 2, at 1669 (proposing
regulating Internet platforms as public utilities in order to remedy problems like “outsized abilities
to set the terms of exchange” and the ability to “exploit . . . the mountains of data” platforms collect
that “can enable subtle forms of pricing, racial, and geographic discrimination”); Zeynep Tufekci,
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the Conclusion highlights, the rise of Digital Switzerlands may have
implications for company–user dynamics as well.7
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the parallel evolutions
of governments’ role vis-à-vis cyberspace and companies’ role vis-à-vis
governments and distinguishes the U.S. technology companies from
potential historical and contemporary analogues. Part II unpacks the idea of
“Digital Switzerland,” exploring the accuracy of the embedded claims of
parity and neutrality, and oﬀering a model to describe when the Digital
Switzerland mantle will lead the companies to challenge governments (or
not). Part III identiﬁes key criteria for normatively assessing the rise of
technology companies as Digital Switzerlands and oﬀers preliminary
evaluations of the companies’ performance to date.
I. THE PARALLEL EVOLUTION OF COMPETING POWERS
The roles of governments and technology companies vis-à-vis cyberspace
have evolved along separate, but occasionally intersecting tracks, leaving U.S.

Opinion, We Already Know How to Protect Ourselves from Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/opinion/zuckerberg-testify-congress.html (proposing to address
data privacy and aggregation concerns through legislative action, for example, to give individuals
access to data companies collect about them); Susan Landau, No, Facebook, It’s Not About Security;
It’s About Privacy, LAWFARE (Mar. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/no-facebookits-not-about-security-its-about-privacy [https://perma.cc/4U5M-KQ7H] (arguing that the Cambridge
Analytica scandal is “a failure to protect the privacy of users’ data” and that Facebook cannot adequately
address the problem because “sharing of user data lies at the heart of Facebook’s business”); Frank
Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, LAW & POL. ECON. (Dec.
6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-case-of-amazon
[https://perma.cc/LY9W-B7WZ] (using a political economy perspective to express concern about
the power of “major digital ﬁrms” that “are no longer market participants,” but “market makers, able
to exert regulatory control over the terms on which others can sell goods and services”); see also infra
note 201 and accompanying text. These important issues deserve their own treatments, as others
have undertaken, and the role of this Article is to address a diﬀerent and distinct feature of the
technology companies’ behavior. That is not, however, to say that there is no overlap. For example,
recent controversies over the use of Facebook to inﬂuence U.S. voters implicate both the relationship
of the company to its users and the company’s role in international struggles between governments.
See Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested
for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 18:03 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election
[https://perma.cc/BZ6X-CMW2] (detailing how Cambridge Analytica used data gathered from
Facebook to target U.S. voters); Tony Romm, ‘Pro-Beyoncé’ vs. A
‘ nti-Beyoncé’: 3,500 Facebook Ads Show
the Scale of Russian Manipulation, WASH. POST (May 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2018/05/10/here-are-the-3400-facebook-ads-purchased-by-russias-online-trolls-duringthe-2016-election [https://perma.cc/8TPZ-BRXW] (reporting on “Facebook ads purchased by
Russian agents” that “illustrate the extent to which Kremlin-aligned forces sought to stoke social,
cultural and political unrest on one of the Web’s most powerful platforms”).
7 See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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technology companies in a position somewhat diﬀerent from the roles played
by other powerful historical and contemporary private parties.
A. Governments and Cyberspace
The most obvious powers in cyberspace today are governments.
Governments regulate behavior in cyberspace, impose taxes on Internet sales,
exploit electronic communications for surveillance, and conduct oﬀensive and
defensive operations against other governments and malicious actors. But the
possibility and legitimacy of these governmental roles was not always so
obvious. Beginning in the 1990s, academic theorizing about the role of
governments with respect to cyberspace has progressed through three stages.8
In the early days of the Internet, the first generation of activists and academics
argued that cyberspace was outside the power of territorial governments and
subject to rule only by its users.9 David Johnson and David Post argued that
“[c]yberspace . . . needs and can create its own law and legal institutions,” separate
and apart from existing territorial governments and their legal regimes.10
The cyber-as-sovereign arguments provoked an academic backlash and a
practical defeat. The second generation of theorists argued that existing
territorial governments could and should exercise sovereignty over cyberspace.
Jack Goldsmith argued that territorial sovereignty’s relationship to cyberspace
is straightforward: governments can regulate “persons within the territory who
use the Internet,” hardware and software in the government’s territory, and “the
local effects of extraterritorial acts.”11 Normatively, Goldsmith and Tim Wu
argued that government regulation is necessary and desirable because “only
traditional territorial governments can provide [public] goods,”12 and effectively
deal with threats like “viruses, online fraud, spam, and other abuses.”13 As a
practical matter, governments now regulate online behavior extensively, through
criminal laws and other regulations. The traditional sovereigns—states—clearly
and forcefully exert their power over individuals in cyberspace.
8 For a more detailed exposition of the three generations, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law
of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 325-29 (2015).
9 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that the transborder nature of Internet-based communications
“undermin[es] the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on geographic boundaries”); John Perry
Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/YHM7-SZLX] (“Governments of
the Industrial World . . . have no sovereignty where we gather.”).
10 Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1367.
11 Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 (1998).
12 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 142 (2006).
13 Id. at 145.
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The third and most recent generation of academic work shifts from
considering the role of territorial sovereigns vis-à-vis individuals, and instead
focuses on issues of Internet governance and lawful state behavior in
cyberspace.14 This work is driven by recent contests between states over issues
like competing visions of Internet governance15 and by debates over whether and
if so, how existing international law applies to states’ actions in cyberspace.16
While commentators have paid considerable attention to the evolving role
of governments, less attention has been paid to a parallel and ongoing
evolution featuring technology companies.
B. Technology Companies and Cyberspace
In recent years, major U.S. technology companies have grown into power
centers that compete with territorial governments.17 They are now beginning
to be, in some senses, competing sovereigns,18 and self-consciously so.
14 See, e.g., LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 23 (2014)
(“A significant question of Internet governance addresses the appropriate balance of power between
sovereign nation-state governance and non-territorial and privatized mechanisms.”); MILTON
MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 9
(2010) (“Internet governance is the simplest, most direct, and inclusive label for the ongoing set of
disputes and deliberations over how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect
policies.”); Eichensehr, supra note 8 (discussing the development of norms for state behavior in
cyberspace); Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity, 110
AM. J. INT’L L. 425, 427-29 (2016) (offering a process-oriented approach to construction of norms for
appropriate state behavior in cyberspace); Kal Raustiala, Editorial Comment, Governing the Internet,
110 AM. J. INT’L L. 491, 492 (2016) (discussing the U.S. strategy with respect to Internet governance).
15 See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 8, at 330-32 (discussing states’ competing visions of
multistakeholder and multilateral Internet governance); Raustiala, supra note 14, at 492 (arguing that
U.S. relinquishment of control over ICANN will strengthen “multistakeholderism . . . not just for
ICANN, but as a broader principle of global governance”).
16 For example, Russia’s hacking and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections has sparked debate
about the scope of the prohibition on intervention. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber
Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1580 (2017) (arguing
that Russia’s actions violated the right to self-determination); Ryan Goodman, International Law and
the US Response to Russian Election Interference, JUST SEC. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
35999/international-law-response-russian-election-interference [https://perma.cc/D9T8-JR9N] (discussing
international law regarding the Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack and the U.S. response
thereto); Duncan Hollis, Russia and the DNC Hack: What Future for a Duty of Non-Intervention, OPINIO
JURIS (July 25, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/25/russia-and-the-dnc-hack-a-violation-of-theduty-of-non-intervention [https://perma.cc/A4C8-6CJ7] (discussing the scope of the international
law prohibition on intervention).
17 The limitation to U.S. companies is a deliberate one. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV., DON’T PANIC:
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 9 (2016), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BG3X-NNUQ] (noting that U.S. tech companies “are increasingly playing a quasi-sovereign role as
they face diﬃcult decisions when foreign government agencies pressure them to produce data about
citizens abroad”); REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE
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Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has said, “In a lot of ways Facebook is more
like a government than a traditional company.”19
That was not always the case. Technology companies have a history of
collaborating with, rather than challenging, both foreign governments and the
United States.20 In the early to mid-2000s, many of the U.S. technology
companies entered the Chinese market. To do business in China, the
companies faced demands from the Chinese government,21 and some of their
actions in response to such requests drew particular ire. Most infamously,
Yahoo complied with Chinese government requests to turn over email records
of two Chinese dissidents, who were then convicted and imprisoned.22 In a
February 2006 hearing, U.S. congressmen excoriated Cisco Systems, Google,
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 154 (2012) (arguing that U.S. tech companies “operate a kind
of private sovereignty in cyberspace”); Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1808
(2012) (“Facebook has become so powerful and omnipresent that some have begun to employ the
language of nationhood to describe it.”); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 133, 199 (2017) (“Dominant platforms’ role in the international legal order increasingly
resembles that of sovereign states.”); Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s
Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html (“Facebook has connected more than 2.2
billion people, a global nation unto itself that reshaped political campaigns, the advertising business
and daily life around the world.”); Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR
(Aug. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109
[https://perma.cc/M6Z4-7Y5B] (“You see Google acting in some ways as nation-states used to act,
exercising to the best of their ability some attributes traditionally associated with sovereign states.
We’re going to break relationships—cease doing business there . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting former NSA Director Michael Hayden)). But see ANDREW KEANE WOODS,
HOOVER INST., TECH FIRMS ARE NOT SOVEREIGNS 1 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/research/docs/woods_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/74JC-VAAX] (arguing
that tech ﬁrms are not a serious threat to state sovereignty).
19 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY
THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2011).
20 See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence
of the State in the Digital Environment, VA. J.L. & TECH., Summer 2003, at 1, ¶¶ 2-3 (noting that private
technology companies were “recruited, or co-opted, to serve the State” and that many “volunteer[ed]
to join the State’s efforts,” citing eBay’s policy on disclosures to law enforcement); Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and
Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 595, 621 (2004) (detailing
eBay’s policy circa 2003 of turning information over to law enforcement absent a court order).
21 Prominent among the demands was censoring of search results. See, e.g., Clive Thompson,
Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 23, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html (describing Google’s decision to
enter the Chinese market in 2006 and the choices it made about how to censor search results).
22 See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Yahoo Helped Chinese to Prosecute Journalist, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/08/business/worldbusiness/yahoo-helped-chinese-to-prosecutejournalist.html (detailing the case of Shi Tao, who was sentenced to a ten-year prison term); Elinor Mills,
Yahoo Settles Lawsuit with Jailed Chinese Journalists, CNET (Nov. 13, 2007, 7:41 PM GMT),
https://www.cnet.com/uk/news/yahoo-settles-lawsuit-with-jailed-chinese-journalists (reporting that
Yahoo settled a case brought by Shi Tao and Wang Xiaoning, journalists serving prison sentences as a
result of information that Yahoo disclosed to the Chinese government).
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Microsoft, and Yahoo for what Representative Christopher Smith deemed
“‘sickening collaboration’ with the Chinese government.”23 No doubt driven
in part (perhaps large part) by negative publicity stemming from cooperation
with the Chinese government,24 those companies slowly began to shift to
countering foreign governments on some fronts.25
1. Countering Foreign Governments
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant public move to challenge a foreign government came
in January 2010.26 In a blog post by Chief Legal Oﬃcer David Drummond,
Google announced “[a] new approach to China.”27 The post explained that in
December 2009, Google discovered a “highly sophisticated and targeted
attack on [Google’s] corporate infrastructure originating from China that
resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.”28 But Google
explained that it had “evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers
was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists” and that
“the accounts of dozens of U.S., China and Europe based Gmail users who
are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely
accessed by third parties.”29 While Google did not directly accuse the Chinese
23 Tom Zeller Jr., Web Firms Are Grilled on Dealings in China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/technology/web-ﬁrms-are-grilled-on-dealings-in-china.html.
24 See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Tech Execs Get Grilled over China Business, FORTUNE (Feb. 16, 2006,
10:43 AM EST), http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/15/news/international/pluggedin_fortune
[https://perma.cc/PU5H-4T7H] (“[T]he controversy has taken some of the glow oﬀ the image
promoted by Internet ﬁrms like Yahoo and Google.”).
25 See infra Section II.C (discussing the scope of the Digital Switzerlands idea, including when
companies will challenge governments and the diﬃculties posed by nondemocratic governments).
26 Although this Article focuses on U.S. technology companies, the willingness to challenge
governments is not a purely U.S. phenomenon. For example, Blackberry, a Canadian company, see
Company, BLACKBERRY, https://ca.blackberry.com/company [https://perma.cc/A6SL-58F3] (last
visited Feb. 8, 2019), announced that it would exit the Pakistani market rather than comply with the
Pakistani government’s demand to monitor communications made using Blackberry’s network in the
country. Marty Beard, Why BlackBerry Is Exiting Pakistan, BLACKBERRY: INSIDE BLACKBERRY
(Nov. 30, 2015), http://blogs.blackberry.com/2015/11/why-blackberry-is-exiting-pakistan [https://perma.cc/
8GQ6-M769]. Ultimately, the Pakistani government apparently backed down, and BlackBerry
continued to operate in the country. See Marty Beard, Continuing Our Operations in Pakistan,
BLACKBERRY: INSIDE BLACKBERRY (Dec. 31, 2015), http://blogs.blackberry.com/2015/12/
continuing-our-operations-in-pakistan [https://perma.cc/HN7Y-QMKV] (explaining that BlackBerry
is “grateful to the . . . Pakistani government for accepting BlackBerry’s position that we cannot provide
the content of our customers’ BES traﬃc, nor will we provide access to our BES servers”).
27 David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE (Jan. 12, 2010), http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html [https://perma.cc/C8PL-QHRS].
28 Id. The post further explained that “at least twenty other large companies . . . have been
similarly targeted.” Id.; see also SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY INTERNET
COMPLEX 172 (2014) (noting other targets, including Adobe, Juniper Networks, Northrup
Grumman, Symantec, and Yahoo).
29 Drummond, supra note 27.
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government, it tied the revelations to “a much bigger global debate about
freedom of speech,” and explained: “These attacks and the surveillance they
have uncovered—combined with the attempts over the past year to further
limit free speech on the web—have led us to conclude that we should review
the feasibility of our business operations in China.”30
Google’s post and the challenge it posed to the Chinese government marked
a major milestone. At the time, the press called it a “highly unusual rebuke of
China by one of the largest and most admired technology companies,”31 and a
“startling announcement.”32 In retrospect, the move has been called “historic.”33
30 Id. Google announced that it would cease censoring search results, which it had done since
entering the Chinese market. Id. In March 2010, Google stopped censoring search results on
Google.cn and instead redirected users to uncensored searching on its website in Hong Kong. David
Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update, GOOGLE (Mar. 22, 2010), https://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html [https://perma.cc/PD5G-P85N]; see Ellen
Nakashima, Cecelia Kang & John Pomfret, Google to Stop Censoring Search Results in China, WASH.
POST (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/22/
AR2010032202041.html [https://perma.cc/748T-MBVT] (reporting Google’s decision to redirect
searches through Hong Kong). Several months later, as a condition of a license renewal that allowed
Google to continue operating in China, Google ceased automatically redirecting users to the Hong Kong
site, instead posting a link on Google.cn that allowed users to reach the Hong Kong site, while using
Google.cn for music and other searches that remained unfiltered. See David Drummond, An Update on
China, GOOGLE (June 28, 2010), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/update-on-china.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8B5-88XK] (last updated July 9, 2010) (noting that China renewed Google’s
license to operate); Google Says China License Renewed by Government, BBC (July 9, 2010),
http://www.bbc.com/news/10566318 [https://perma.cc/YL99-YGRZ] (describing Google’s actions to
secure the license renewal).
31 Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html.
32 Kim Zetter, Google to Stop Censoring Search Results in China After Hack Attack, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2010,
7:10 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/google-censorship-china [https://perma.cc/5TLM-DWZX].
33 See HARRIS, supra note 28, at 173 (“For any company to come out against China would be
momentous. But for Google, the most influential company of the Internet age, it was historic.”); see also Sarah
McKune & Ronald Deibert, Google’s Dragonfly: A Bellweather for Human Rights in the Digital Age, JUST SEC.
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/59941/googles-dragonfly-bellwether-human-rights-digitalage [https://perma.cc/YKS6-WBSQ] (calling Google’s exit “a bold, nearly unheard of action by a
corporate actor in the face of pressure by one of the world’s most powerful governments”). Recent
reports suggest that Google is considering re-entering the Chinese market with a mobile search
engine that will censor results. Ryan Gallagher, Google Plans to Launch Censored Search Engine in China,
Leaked Documents Reveal, INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:58 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/
google-china-search-engine-censorship [https://perma.cc/3YL2-ZBV4]. The reports have prompted
privacy-based criticism. See, e.g., Michael C. Bender & Dustin Volz, Pence Calls on Google to Drop
Mobile Search Project in China, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2018, 5:10 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/pence-calls-on-google-to-drop-mobile-search-project-in-china-1538680844 (reporting a speech
in which U.S. Vice President Mike Pence urged Google to “immediately end development of the
Dragonfly app that will strengthen Communist Party censorship and compromise the privacy of Chinese
customers”); Kate Conger, Ex-Google Employee Urges Lawmakers to Take on Company, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/google-privacy-china-congress.html (discussing a
letter from a former Google employee to senators criticizing “Dragonﬂy,” the Chinese search engine
product, on privacy grounds). Criticisms, including by Google employees, appear to have halted the
project for now. See Aaron Mak, Hundreds of Employees Demand Google Stop Work on Censored
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Google pioneered another means of countering foreign governments. In June
2012, the company announced that it would begin warning users who the
company believed were being targeted by foreign governments.34 The warning is
delivered by a banner at the top of a Google login page, stating “Warning: We
believe state-sponsored attackers may be attempting to compromise your account
or computer,” and linking users to advice on how to protect the security of their
accounts.35 In 2015, other companies followed Google’s lead.36 Facebook,37
Yahoo,38 and Microsoft39 all announced that they will notify users that the
companies believe are being targeted by state-sponsored actors.40 The companies
combine the warnings with instructions on how to re-secure or better secure the
users’ accounts, thus thwarting the attacks by the state-sponsored hackers.41

Search Engine for China, SLATE (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/
google-employees-sign-petition-to-end-project-dragonfly.html [https://perma.cc/F6TX-ANTJ] (discussing
open letter signed by hundreds of Google employees); see also Ryan Gallagher, Google’s Secret China
Project “Effectively Ended” After Internal Confrontation, INTERCEPT (Dec. 17, 2018, 12:22 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/12/17/google-china-censored-search-engine-2 (reporting that progress
on Dragonfly has halted).
34 Eric Grosse, Security Warnings for Suspected State-Sponsored Attacks, GOOGLE: SEC. BLOG
(June 5, 2012), https://security.googleblog.com/2012/06/security-warnings-for-suspected-state.html
[https://perma.cc/ER7P-D3SH].
35 Id. (emphasis omitted).
36 See Kristen Eichensehr, “Your Account May Have Been Targeted by State-Sponsored Actors”: Attribution
and Evidence of State-Sponsored Cyberattacks, JUST SEC. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/
28731/your-account-targeted-state-sponsored-actors-attribution-evidence-state-sponsored-cyberattacks
[https://perma.cc/5BLN-2S47] (collecting and analyzing the companies’ announcements).
37 Alex Stamos, Notifications for Targeted Attacks, FACEBOOK (Oct. 16, 2015, 7:36 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/notifications-for-targeted-attacks/10153092994615766
[https://perma.cc/8UJP-SKJR]. Facebook’s notiﬁcation system reportedly provided the ﬁrst
indication that Iranian hackers compromised the accounts of State Department officials working on Iran
and the Middle East. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Iranian Hackers Attack State Dept. via Social
Media Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/middleeast/
iran-hackers-cyberespionage-state-department-social-media.html.
38 Bob Lord, Notifying Our Users of Attacks by Suspected State-Sponsored Actors, YAHOO SEC. (Dec. 21,
2015), https://yahoo-security.tumblr.com/post/135674131435/notifying-our-users-of-attacks-by-suspected
[https://perma.cc/F4AS-EBM7].
39 Scott Charney, Additional Steps to Help Keep Your Personal Information Secure, MICROSOFT:
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Dec. 30, 2015), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/12/30/
additional-steps-to-help-keep-your-personal-information-secure [https://perma.cc/6GZ9-Z7VX].
40 Although it did not announce a formal policy, Twitter similarly began notifying users
targeted by state-sponsored actors. See, e.g., Ashley Carman, Twitter Users Targeted by State-Sponsored
Attackers, VERGE (Dec. 12, 2015, 9:32 AM EST), https://www.theverge.com/2015/12/12/9931178/
twitter-state-sponsored-attack [https://perma.cc/6PJH-6NSX] (reporting that some Twitter users
received notiﬁcations stating that their accounts “may have been targeted by state-sponsored actors”
(quoting @Anne_Roth, TWITTER (Dec. 11, 2015, 8:11 PM), https://twitter.com/Anne_Roth/status/
675467882407591936 [https://perma.cc/8VGE-V7G3])).
41 See Charney, supra note 39; Grosse, supra note 34; Lord, supra note 38; Stamos, supra note 37.
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2. Countering All Governments—Sometimes
U.S. technology companies’ moves to counter governments accelerated
with the Snowden disclosures and refocused on countering the U.S.
government. The Snowden disclosures began in June 2013 and fundamentally
changed the calculus regarding cooperation with the U.S. government.42
While companies had previously assisted the government, even above and
beyond their legal obligations to do so,43 as a result of disclosures, “[t]here is
now business value in championing privacy and ﬁghting” the U.S.
government “and business harm in cooperation.”44
The companies’ shift to a more adversarial stance toward the U.S.
government occurred quickly. One of the early reports based on documents
leaked by Edward Snowden in June 2013 indicated that pursuant to a program
called “PRISM,” “[t]he National Security Agency and the FBI [were] tapping
directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies,
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and
connection logs.”45 The report indicated that the government collected
information directly from servers owned by Apple, Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, and Yahoo, among others, prompting the companies to vehemently
deny that they permitted such access.46 Days later, after “intense talks between
federal officials and several of the technology companies . . . over what details
[could] be released” about government information requests,47 Google filed a
motion for a declaratory judgment with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, arguing for a First Amendment right to publish aggregate information
on the number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders it
42 See DAVID E. SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON: WAR, SABOTAGE, AND FEAR IN THE CYBER
AGE 85 (2018) (“The Snowden affair kicked off a remarkable era in which American firms, for the first
time in post–World War II history, broadly refused to cooperate with the American government.”).
43 See Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War
on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 910-16 (2008) (providing details of assistance that U.S.
telecommunications and other companies voluntarily provided to the U.S. government after the
September 11 attacks); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44 BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 207 (2015); see also ADAM SEGAL, THE HACKED WORLD
ORDER: HOW NATIONS FIGHT, TRADE, MANEUVER, AND MANIPULATE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
20 (2016) (“American companies are now more willing to stand up to Washington and to align with
the interests of global customers.”).
45 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet
Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/
2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/EP5F-BU9A].
46 Id.
47 Craig Timberg & Cecilia Kang, Google Challenges U.S. Gag Order, Citing First
Amendment, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
google-challenges-us-gag-order-citing-first-amendment/2013/06/18/96835c72-d832-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_
story.html [https://perma.cc/PAT3-MXSL].
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receives and the number of users covered by the requests.48 The lawsuit “[came]
as the firms increasingly show[ed] signs of wanting to outdo each other in
demonstrating their commitment to protecting user privacy.”49 Ultimately,
Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and LinkedIn also challenged the gag rules, and
the confrontation ended in January 2014 with a compromise allowing the
companies to disclose additional information about government requests for
customer data pursuant to national security letters and FISA orders.50
Additional litigation to resist U.S. government demands and gag orders
has followed. A prominent example was the dispute between the U.S.
government and Apple over access to the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino
shooters. The Department of Justice obtained an order from a magistrate
judge to compel Apple to write code that would have disabled some of the
phone’s security features, including by allowing the government an unlimited
number of attempts to guess the phone’s passcode.51 Apple resisted the order
in court52 and in the court of public opinion.53 On the eve of a hearing, the
government ultimately dropped its demand for Apple’s assistance, revealing
that it had paid a private party for a tool to access the iPhone.54
48 See Google’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), http://apps.
washingtonpost.com/g/page/business/googles-motion-for-declaratory-judgment/238 [https://perma.cc/
7JCF-RXFE] (providing text of In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.’s First Amendment Right to
Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, as filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court).
49 Timberg & Kang, supra note 47.
50 See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colin
Stretch, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Facebook, et al. (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ36-42Q9]) (detailing what information
companies may release and when); see also Matt Apuzzo & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Relaxes Some Data
Disclosure Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/business/
government-to-allow-technology-companies-to-disclose-more-data-on-surveillance-requests.html
(describing new rules for disclosure).
51 Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 2, In re the Search of an Apple
Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016), 2016 WL 618401, at *1.
52 Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, &
Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Apple’s Assistance, In re the Search of an Apple
Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. CM 16-10
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order].
53 See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/
customer-letter [https://perma.cc/S4UF-B8J4] (“Opposing this order is not something we take
lightly. We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.”).
54 Government’s Ex Parte Application for a Continuance at 3, In re the Search of an Apple
Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. CM 16-10
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016); Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Director Suggests Bill for iPhone
Hacking Topped $1.3 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/us/
politics/fbi-director-suggests-bill-for-iphone-hacking-was-1-3-million.html; see also LUCAS KELLO,
THE VIRTUAL WEAPON AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 182 (2017) (arguing that this episode shows
that “the private sector was supreme over the sovereign” because “the world’s most powerful
government overcame the resistance of company executives more powerful than itself in dealing
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Microsoft has also brought several suits. In one recent case, Microsoft resisted
complying with a warrant issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act for
the contents of an email account stored in Ireland.55 Microsoft provided the
government with the noncontent account information stored in the United
States, but argued that, as to the content stored in Ireland, the warrant was an
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.56 The Second Circuit
agreed with Microsoft,57 and the Supreme Court granted review.58 Congress
passed a bill mooting the case before the Supreme Court could resolve it.59
In another case, Microsoft sued the Department of Justice, arguing that a
provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) is
unconstitutional.60 In particular, the company argued that the ECPA provision
allowing courts to impose gag orders that prevent the company from alerting
customers when the government seeks access to the customers’ email or other
information violates the First and Fourth Amendments.61 Microsoft prevailed.
The Department of Justice issued a new binding policy, limiting the use and
duration of secrecy orders,62 and Microsoft, declaring the policy an
“unequivocal win for [its] customers,” moved to dismiss the lawsuit.63
These steps by U.S. technology companies to challenge foreign governments
and the U.S. government focus mostly on the negative—countering government
action. What was missing was an affirmative theory to describe the role the
companies are playing. That began to change in 2017.

with a matter of national security signiﬁcance only because the state recruited or bought the
sympathies of another private player”).
55 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 855
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017). For additional analysis of the Microsoft
case and extraterritorial jurisdiction issues, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, Data Extraterritoriality, 95
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 145, 149-53 (2017).
56 Eichensehr, supra note 55, at 149-50.
57 Id. at 150.
58 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017).
59 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1187-88 (2018) (acknowledging that the
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) rendered the case moot, and vacating
and remanding with instructions to dismiss as moot).
60 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1-4, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No.
2:16-cv-00538 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 2016); see Developments in the Law—More Data, More Problems,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1714, 1738 (2018) (calling this lawsuit “an example of surveillance intermediaries
at their best” because “Microsoft noticed a pattern of the government overusing secrecy orders and
mobilized its considerable resources to change this practice . . . [doing] so of its own volition”).
61 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 60, at 9-16.
62 Nick Wingfield, U.S. to Limit Use of Secrecy Orders That Microsoft Challenged, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/microsoft-justice-department-secrecy.html.
63 Brad Smith, DOJ Acts to Curb the Overuse of Secrecy Orders. Now It’s Congress’ Turn, MICROSOFT:
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/10/23/
doj-acts-curb-overuse-secrecy-orders-now-congress-turn [https://perma.cc/5NPN-RUBE].
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3. An Emerging Aﬃrmative Platform?
In a keynote speech at the 2017 RSA conference, Microsoft President Brad
Smith provided a new, positive label for the role of technology companies in the
cyberspace ecosystem.64 Smith called for the “global technology sector . . . to
become a trusted and neutral Digital Switzerland.”65 Smith exhorted technology
companies to work together and argued:
We need to be clear that we will assist and protect customers everywhere.
That is what we do regardless of the country from which we come.
We need to be clear that we will not aid in attacking customers anywhere,
regardless of the government that may ask us to do so.66

The “Digital Switzerland” label shifts from the prior baseline of
companies deﬁning their role in opposition to governments to a potential and
perhaps partial embrace of an aﬃrmative platform going forward.67 The
phrase describes, however, an emerging posture that is still in its infancy and
fraught with growing pains, as explored in detail in Part II.68

64 Smith, supra note 1, at 12. Smith’s speech was not the first time that Microsoft officials had
floated the Switzerland analogy. In remarks at New York University School of Law in April 2016, Microsoft
Corporate Vice President Scott Charney also characterized the company as akin to Switzerland. See N.Y.U.
Sch. of Law Ctr. on Law & Sec., Governing Intelligence: Panel II: The New Transnational Oversight,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2016, 17:40), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kTYMz-GSxA [https://perma.cc/
85Q9-LBBH] [hereinafter Governing Intelligence] (statement of Scott Charney, Corporate Vice
President, Microsoft Corp.) (“[W]hen one country attacks another country, whether it be an espionage
program or a cyber military operation, for us, that’s one customer attacking another customer. And
either customer might ask us for support and help. And that’s why . . . we have to . . . be Switzerland.
We have to do defense and not offense.”).
65 Smith, supra note 1, at 12.
66 Id. at 13; see also id. at 12 (“We need to be a global industry that the world can rely on to play
100 percent defense and zero percent oﬀense.”).
67 David Post has argued that Smith’s Digital Switzerland speech embraces the view that he, David
Johnson, and to some extent John Perry Barlow, advanced in the 1990s of cyberspace as a separate place,
apart from the rule of territorial governments. David Post, Microsoft’s Brad Smith on Cyberattacks,
Cybersecurity, and ‘Cyberspace’, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/10/microsofts-brad-smith-on-cyberattacks-cybersecurity-and-cyberspace
[https://perma.cc/LN4W-A7PT]; see supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. But according to
Smith, it is the companies—the technology sector—that should be a Digital Switzerland; Smith
does not argue, as Post suggests, that cyberspace itself is a place that should be akin to a neutral
country. See Smith, supra note 1, at 12 (“[W]e as a global technology sector need to become a trusted
and neutral Digital Switzerland.”); cf. Milton Mueller, Searching for that “Neutral Digital Switzerland”,
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/03/03/
searching-for-that-neutral-digital-switzerland [https://perma.cc/ZHA8-9UAS] (“[T]he fact that
Microsoft’s President was willing to issue a 2017 version of the declaration of the independence of
cyberspace is heartening.”).
68 See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
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C. Distinguishing Other Powerful Private Parties
U.S. technology companies are by no means the ﬁrst superempowered
private parties.69 Think of the British East India Company, which ruled India
as a government despite its corporate form,70 or recent examples like
ExxonMobil. But three features of the U.S. technology companies, if taken
together, suggest that they diﬀer from other powerful private actors in ways
that may facilitate their ability to serve as “Digital Switzerlands.”71
1. They aspire to be global, not national.72 The Digital Switzerlands concept
depends on the companies’ ability to remain, and be perceived as remaining,
independent from governments, including their national government.73 They

69 Cf. The Rise of the Superstars, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21707048-small-group-giant-companiessome-old-some-neware-once-again-dominating-global
?fsrc=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/theriseofthesuperstars [https://perma.cc/E7AP-PRP3] (“Apple, Google, Amazon
and their peers dominate today’s economy just as surely as US Steel, Standard Oil and Sears, Roebuck
and Company dominated the economy of Roosevelt’s day.”).
70 Adam Smith referred to the situation as a “strange absurdity.” ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 602 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776); see PHILIP J. STERN, THE
COMPANY STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 3-6 (2012) (explaining that the British East India Company “did
what early modern governments did,” including “erect and administer laws; collect taxes, provide
protection; inﬂict punishment; . . . conduct diplomacy and wage war”); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 26 (2018) (noting
with respect to the East India Company in the mid-1700s, that “[t]he corporation had become a
government, with all the power that entails”).
71 In addition to the diﬀerences discussed here, The Economist highlights another distinguishing
feature of the technology companies as compared to earlier powerful corporations, namely that they
have “few assets” and employees. See The Rise of the Superstars, supra note 69, at 5 (noting that with
similar revenues, the top three U.S. carmakers in 1990 had 1.2 million employees, while the “top
three companies in Silicon Valley” in 2014 had “just 137,000 employees”).
72 They are also global, not (just) local. There are many precedents for private parties
exercising extensive but localized control. Consider company towns where “a single business built,
owned, and operated the entire town,” often populated by the business’s employees. M. Todd
Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1535 (2009); see HARDY GREEN, THE
COMPANY TOWN: THE INDUSTRIAL EDENS AND SATANIC MILLS THAT SHAPED THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 4-5 (2010) (contrasting “exploitationville” versus utopian company towns);
Leanna Garﬁeld, Facebook and Amazon Are So Big They’re Creating Their Own Company Towns—Here’s
the 200-Year Evolution, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2018, 9:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
company-town-history-facebook-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/2853-MSR3] (discussing historical examples).
Or cities like Detroit, where the car industry has dominated the area, despite not running an actual
company town. Some of the tech companies are eﬀectively creating company towns in parts of
Silicon Valley. See id. (discussing Facebook in Menlo Park and Amazon in Seattle); Jessica Guynn,
Welcome to Zucker Burg, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/10/
business/la-fi-facebook-company-town-20120810 [https://perma.cc/WBZ7-ZB8A] (discussing Facebook’s
construction of an extensive campus in Menlo Park). But the companies exercise different kinds of
important powers over their users worldwide, and it is those powers—the global powers—that are the
focus of this Article. See infra Part III.
73 See Mueller, supra note 67 (“Smith seems genuinely interested in detaching his company
from national allegiances in favor of customer allegiance.”).
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therefore stand in stark contrast to companies, like Royal Dutch Shell or British
Petroleum (BP), that embraced a national origin story,74 and to prototypical
government contractors, like Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman. As David
Sanger recently highlighted, the companies have “a concept of corporate identity
that is the complete reverse of the Cold War,” where defense contractors “were
serving governments, not consumers, and so . . . willingly picked a side.”75 By
contrast, the tech companies “view themselves . . . as essentially neutral—loyal to
the customer base first and individual governments second.”76
The U.S. tech companies are also distinguishable from companies that are
partly government-owned or controlled. This sets U.S. technology companies
apart not only from older companies, like Volkswagen,77 but also from
technology companies headquartered in other parts of the world. For example,
China has pushed for an ownership stake in and direct control over some of its
biggest technology companies, including Tencent and Weibo.78 It would be
implausible for companies that are directly owned or controlled by
governments—or under the threat of such ownership or control—to claim the
mantles of neutrality and parity embedded in the Digital Switzerlands concept.
Although all governments may regulate companies in their jurisdiction, the
exertion of direct ownership or control is qualitatively different.
Today, the Digital Switzerlands concept is most likely limited to companies in
the United States and Western Europe, where private companies are likely, though
not certain, to remain independent of direct government control.79 Companies in
74 Another contrast can be drawn between the consumer-focused technology companies and
cybersecurity-speciﬁc companies. Companies, like FireEye from the United States and Kaspersky
Labs from Russia, have been accused of diﬀerentially revealing cyber operations, speciﬁcally
declining to reveal operations conducted by their own national government. See Kristen E.
Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 492-93 (2017) (discussing allegations
against cybersecurity companies of “pulling punches for national governments”). FireEye oﬃcials
admitted in a recent interview that while they remove U.S. and allied intruders from their
customers’ systems, they refrain from publicizing such intrusions. Zaid Shoorbajee, Playing Nice?
FireEye CEO Says U.S. Malware Is More Restrained than Adversaries’, CYBERSCOOP (June 1, 2018),
https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice [https://perma.cc/W2SE-SMUL].
75 SANGER, supra note 42, at 267.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Alison Smale, In Germany, a Cozy Relationship Between Carmakers and Government,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/europe/germany-volkswagenautos-merkel.html (noting that Volkswagen is partly owned by the government of Lower Saxony and
that the regional governor holds a seat on the company’s board).
78 Li Yuan, Beijing Pushes for a Direct Hand in China’s Tech Firms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:27 PM
ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-pushes-for-a-direct-hand-in-chinas-big-tech-firms-1507758314.
79 For example, the signatories to the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, see infra notes 132–35 and
accompanying text, come from the United States, Finland, and Spain, and do not include companies
from countries identiﬁed as responsible for some of the major recent cyberattacks—countries like
China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. David E. Sanger, Tech Firms Sign ‘Digital Geneva Accord’ Not
to Aid Governments in Cyberwar, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/
us/politics/tech-companies-cybersecurity-accord.html.
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the United States and Western Europe that assert independence and challenge
their governments run the risk of regulation, but not of nationalization.
2. They have global users, not just customers or shareholders. For some of the
companies, their users are not customers in the traditional sense. Users of Facebook
and Google do not pay money for the privilege.80 For companies like Microsoft
and Apple, the relationship may be partly transactional, but it also stretches into a
long-term ongoing dependence, where users rely on the company for services and
trust the company to keep potentially sensitive information secure.
The nature of the relationship between the technology companies and users
therefore differs from a traditional transaction-focused relationship between
companies and customers.81 Unlike companies that merely sell goods to
customers, the tech companies’ relationship to their users is more intimate,
more expansive, and more constant than even a series of recurring transactions.
3. They are attractive, not extractive. Powerful private companies, especially
in earlier eras, were often headquartered in Europe or the United States and
focused on extracting natural resources abroad. To do so they entered into
agreements with foreign governments, setting the terms of their business’s
operations in the country. This system created little need for the companies
to develop broad appeal among the populace in the countries where they
operated, and in egregious instances, the companies committed or facilitated
human rights violations against local populations.82
Some argue that certain tech companies—primarily those that derive
revenue from using user data for ad sales83—are in fact extractive because of
See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
Cf. JON D. MICHAELS, HOOVER INST., TECH GIANTS AT THE CROSSROADS: A MODEST
PROPOSAL 3-4 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/michaels_webreadypdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SR9F-84EE] (arguing that among the features that “distinguish[] the tech space”
is that the “platforms at issue are ones that impinge on users’ political rights and interests (making
these ﬁrms diﬀerent from, say, Walmart or General Motors)”); SEGAL, supra note 44, at 20-21 (“GM,
Procter & Gamble (P&G), and Coca-Cola are global companies, but their relationships with their
customers are relatively limited and transactional. They market and sell a product. . . . The technology
companies’ missions have been much more expansive . . . and so these companies have a more
complicated, intense personal relationship to their customers that, if they have their way, will extend
over years and into almost every aspect of users’ lives.”); Chander, supra note 18, at 1810 (distinguishing
tech companies from earlier companies that “turn[ed] to the world as a market for goods,” such as cars).
82 This is not to suggest that the technology companies are paragons of human rights virtues. See, e.g.,
Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-inchina.html (detailing labor and safety issues in facilities that produce Apple products in China).
83 Not all tech companies proﬁt from user data in this way. That is not Apple’s business model,
for example, and Apple’s lack of dependence on user data has positioned it to criticize companies
like Facebook and Google for their use of user data to sell advertising. See, e.g., Natalia Drozdiak &
Stephanie Bodoni, ‘This Is Surveillance.’ Apple CEO Tim Cook Slams Tech Rivals over Data Collection,
TIME (Oct. 24, 2018), http://time.com/5433499/tim-cook-apple-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/
7XQD-UPEL] (reporting on Cook’s comments at an European Union conference); see also JACK M.
BALKIN, HOOVER INST., FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 4 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/
80
81
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the ways in which they proﬁt from data collected from their users.84 These
critics discount the value of the “free” services provided in exchange for access
to user information.85 Recent academic proposals have even suggested that
tech companies should pay users for the data they produce and from which
the companies then derive beneﬁt.86
However, the tech companies’ relationship to user data is not extractive in
the same way as earlier extractive enterprises. This produces a different power
dynamic: whereas powerful companies in earlier eras sometimes resorted to
hard power vis-à-vis local populations,87 the technology companies operate
through soft power.88 Fundamentally, they depend on mass appeal to
businesses, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and
individuals—their users. And these users are not captive audiences.89 The

sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/93FQ-5B4P] (“The problem
with the current business models for social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube is
that they give companies perverse incentives to manipulate end users—or to allow third parties to
manipulate end users—if this might increase advertising revenues, profits, or both.”). Facebook and
Google have responded by highlighting, among other points, the accessibility of their products to broader
swaths of society because their products don’t have a monetary price tag. See Drozdiak & Bodoni, supra
(describing Facebook and Google’s responses to Cook’s critique).
84 See Shoshana Zuboﬀ, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information
Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 79 (2015) (criticizing tech companies as extractive and arguing
that “the methods of production of ‘big data’ from small data and the ways in which ‘big data’ are
valued reﬂect the formal indiﬀerence that characterizes the ﬁrm’s relationship to its populations of
‘users’” and that “[p]opulations are the sources from which data extraction proceeds and the ultimate
targets of the utilities such data produce”).
85 See id. at 83 (“Google’s tools are not the objects of a value exchange. They do not establish
constructive producer-consumer reciprocities. Instead they are the ‘hooks’ that lure users into
extractive operations and turn ordinary life into the daily renewal of a 21st-century Faustian pact.”).
86 See, e.g., Imanol Arrieta Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond “Free”, 1 AM.
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 1-5 (2018) (discussing a market for data as labor, rather than the current
model of data as capital, pursuant to which technology companies would compensate data producers);
Eduardo Porter, Your Data Is Crucial to a Robotic Age. Shouldn’t You Be Paid for It?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/economy/user-data-pay.html (discussing arguments
in favor of paying users for data, including increasing the quality of data provided).
87 ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 220 (3d ed.
2001) (“Hard power is the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through
threat of punishment or promise of reward. Whether by economic carrots or military sticks, the
ability to coax or coerce has long been the central element of power.”)
88 See id. (“Soft power . . . is the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you
want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion.”); see also
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 83 (2011) (noting that nongovernmental actors,
including corporations, can wield soft power).
89 See Cohen, supra note 18, at 145 (noting that for platforms to succeed in “extracting the
surplus value of user data . . . requires large numbers of users generating large amounts of data,”
and therefore “the platform provider’s goal is to become and remain the indispensable point of
intermediation for parties in its target markets” (footnote omitted)).
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companies’ success rests on a bottom-up strategy dependent on the continuing
attractiveness and appeal of their products around the world.90
II. TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES AS DIGITAL SWITZERLANDS
The “Digital Switzerland” moniker captures two substantive ideas.91
First, labeling technology companies as “Digital Switzerland” suggests that
the companies are on par with the governments that try to regulate them.
Second, the speciﬁc choice of Switzerland as the comparator suggests that the
technology companies are not just countries, but neutral countries.92 The
following Sections analyze the extent to which the companies conform to
these two premises and suggest a model for understanding their behavior
consistent with the Digital Switzerlands idea.
A. Parity
The primacy that the Westphalian system places on the role of states makes
the idea that companies are or should be on par with countries potentially
revolutionary. Companies themselves have made some claims to parity,93 but
frequently it is academic and other commentators who compare the companies
to countries.94 In at least some ways, the claim may be descriptively plausible,95
though the companies still fall short of state status in key ways.
Global Constituencies. Consider the companies’ global constituencies. The
user bases of the big U.S. technology companies dwarf the populations of the
90 See NYE, supra note 88, at 84 (“With soft power, what the target thinks is particularly important,
and the targets matter as much as the agents . . . . Soft power is a dance that requires partners.”).
91 The invocation of Switzerland may also bring to mind secrecy and privacy, given the country’s
long history of banking secrecy. But it’s very unlikely that the tech companies intend to associate
themselves with Switzerland’s checkered history of banking secrecy, which includes tax evasion and
resistance to returning Holocaust victims’ accounts to their heirs. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, A Swiss
Bank Is Set to Open Its Secret Files, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/19/business/worldbusiness/19ubs.html (discussing U.S. Justice Department’s settlement
with UBS regarding tax evasion); Henry Weinstein, Holocaust Survivors, Swiss Banks OK Settlement,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/23/news/mn-891 [https://perma.cc/
9524-2FUL] (detailing settlement in class action lawsuit by Holocaust survivors against Swiss banks).
92 For a Swiss government explanation of Switzerland’s neutrality, see STEFAN AESCHIMANN ET AL.,
FED. DEP’T OF DEF., CIVIL PROT. & SPORTS & FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SWISS NEUTRALITY
(4th rev. ed.), https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Swiss%
20neutrality.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MW9-SCSG]. In discussing World War II, the report concludes that
Switzerland “[a]pplied a policy of neutrality,” but notes, with dramatic understatement, that “[i]n retrospect,
Switzerland’s refugee policy should have been more generous.” Id. at 18.
93 Microsoft’s proposal of the Digital Switzerland framing can be understood as an implicit claim
to parity. Facebook has been explicit. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at 254 (“In a lot of ways Facebook
is more like a government than a traditional company.” (quoting Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg)).
94 See, e.g., supra note 18 (collecting sources analogizing companies to states).
95 Part III takes up the question of whether it is normatively desirable.
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vast majority of countries worldwide. Facebook’s 1.47 billion active daily users96
surpasses the population of China (1.38 billion),97 and Microsoft Office’s 1.2
billion users98 nearly equals the population of India (1.30 billion).99 Google’s
Gmail too has over 1 billion active users per month.100 Even Apple, which has
only around half the user base of the companies just discussed, is estimated to
have 588 million users around the world.101 The user bases of any of these
companies would place the company at least third on a ranking of countries by
population.102 The population of the United States (329.3 million)103 now falls
just behind the number of active monthly users of Twitter (330 million).104
The point of these comparisons is to put into perspective the extent of
the impact a policy change by one of these companies has. To be sure, the
companies exercise signiﬁcantly thinner power over individuals than
territorial sovereigns do. Nonetheless, with the exception of China and India,
the number of people directly aﬀected by a governmental policy change pales
in comparison to the number subject to regulation by even one of the
companies discussed, and many people use multiple companies’ products and
services. In at least this sense, the choice of Switzerland as the country
comparator for the technology companies dramatically undersells their reach:
Switzerland’s population is just over 8 million.105
Indeed, the choice to analogize to any single country glosses over one of the
companies’ main sources of power: their transnational reach. Unlike countries,
they are not conﬁned within a single state. To better capture this feature, a
96 Stats, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info [https://perma.cc/
Y8PZ-HUTU?type=image] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (reporting statistic for June 2018).
97 The World Factbook: China, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html [https://perma.cc/5QYY-CKMS] (last updated Jan. 28, 2019).
98 Brian Fung, Microsoft Is Adding LinkedIn to Its Professional Network, WASH. POST (June 13,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/13/microsoft-is-about-to-addlinkedin-to-its-professional-network [https://perma.cc/5TBJ-QB2].
99 The World Factbook: India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html [https://perma.cc/DRR7-MV4Y] (last updated Feb. 5, 2019).
100 See Alyson Shontell, Gmail Now Has More than 1 Billion Monthly Active Users, Along with 6
Other Google Products, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 1, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
gmail-has-1-billion-monthly-active-users-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/23GT-7HEW] (reporting statistics
provided by Google CEO Sundar Pichai in an Alphabet earnings call).
101 Kif Leswing, Investors Are Overlooking Apple’s Next $50 Billion Business, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4,
2016, 2:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisse-estimates-588-million-apple-users-2016-4
[https://perma.cc/Z5EW-4AU7].
102 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: Population, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html#us [https://perma.cc/
33FW-BX36] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
103 The World Factbook: United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html [https://perma.cc/M9DL-LECA] (last updated Jan. 22, 2019).
104 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 46 (Feb. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Twitter 10-K].
105 The World Factbook: Switzerland, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html [https://perma.cc/LY63-HC8W] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019).
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non-nation-state analogy might be more apt—something like a religion with
global adherents or a nongovernmental organization like the International
Committee of the Red Cross—though those analogies too would have flaws.
Financial Resources. The comparison between the ﬁnancial resources of
countries and powerful U.S. technology companies is not quite as dramatic
as the comparison of populations and user bases, but it is still striking. In a
2016 study, the nongovernmental organization Global Justice Now compared
the annual revenues of countries and corporations.106 In a ranking of the top
100 governments and corporations by revenue,107 only 30 countries made the
list, as compared to 70 corporations.108 Apple was the top technology
company, ranked 25th, just behind India and several slots ahead of
Switzerland.109 The top 100 included other U.S. technology companies, such
as Amazon (73rd), HP (77th), and Microsoft (92nd).110 Other technology
companies were slightly further down the rankings. Alphabet, Google’s
parent company, came in at 132nd, just behind Israel (130th).111
Public Roles and Policy Proposals. In addition to the companies’
characteristics, their actions also suggest a self-conception of parity with
governments. Put simply, they act like governments in some circumstances.
U.S. technology companies have taken on some arguably public functions
related to foreign policy and crime control.112 They have thwarted (or at least
attempted to thwart) government cyber operations.113 One way they have

106 10 Biggest Corporations Make More Money than Most Countries in the World Combined, GLOB. JUSTICE
NOW (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2016/sep/12/10-biggest-corporations-makemore-money-most-countries-world-combined [https://perma.cc/GWC9-AMDZ] (explaining that the
annual revenue ﬁgures were taken from the CIA World Factbook for countries and from the Fortune
Global 500 for companies).
107 Corporations vs Governments Revenues: 2015 Data, GLOB. JUSTICE NOW (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/corporations_vs_governments_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7W3-WRNG]; see also Duncan Green, The World’s Top 100 Economies: 31 Countries; 69
Corporations, THE WORLD BANK: PEOPLE, SPACES, DELIBERATION (Sept. 20, 2016), http://blogs.
worldbank.org/publicsphere/world-s-top-100-economies-31-countries-69-corporations [https://perma.cc/
H5HQ-2PQU] (reporting rankings of corporations and governments by Global Justice Now).
108 Phillip Inman, Study: Big Corporations Dominate List of World’s Top Economic Entities,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2016, 10:41 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/12/
global-justice-now-study-multinational-businesses-walmart-apple-shell [https://perma.cc/5NWV-V9JD].
109 Corporations vs Governments Revenues: 2015 Data, supra note 107.
110 Id. Companies outside the technology sector place even higher on the list. See id. (listing,
for example, Walmart 15th and Royal Dutch Shell 18th).
111 Id.
112 For a fuller exploration of why these actions constitute public functions, see Eichensehr,
supra note 74, at 475-78.
113 See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, Putin’s Hackers Now Under Attack—From Microsoft, DAILY BEAST (July 20,
2017, 10:05 PM ET), http://www.thedailybeast.com/microsoft-pushes-to-take-over-russian-spies-network
[https://perma.cc/S2R7-J69Q] (discussing lawsuit filed by Microsoft to take control of command-and-control
servers used by Russian government hackers); see also Report & Recommendation at 16, Microsoft
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done so is by warning individuals who are targeted by state-sponsored
actors.114 Another is through coordinated action to remove malware infections
that state actors use to spy on targets.115
An interesting example occurred in 2014. In a report titled Operation SMN,
a coalition of companies, including Cisco, FireEye, iSight Partners, Microsoft,
and Novetta, explained that they had discovered that the “Axiom” group—“part
of [the] Chinese Intelligence Apparatus”116—had spied on “numerous Fortune
500 companies, journalists, environmental groups, pro-democracy groups,
software companies, academic institutions, and government agencies
worldwide” for several years.117 To address the threat, the companies shared
threat information with “trusted industry partners” around the world, with the
result that “over 43,000 separate installations of Axiom-related tools [were]
removed from machines protected by Operation SMN partners.”118 The
operation was significant because it was entirely industry led, designed, and
executed.119 A representative of one of the companies involved explained that
Operation SMN is “‘the beginning of . . . industry-coordinated efforts to
expose these threat groups, and to do so without having to use law enforcement,
to help corporations and governments around the world combat’ hackers.”120
Companies also engage in cybercrime control eﬀorts. Microsoft in
particular has undertaken a number of “botnet takedowns.”121 “Botnets” are
Corp. v. John Does 1-2, No. 1:16-cv-993 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2017) (recommending that Microsoft’s motion
for default judgment and permanent injunction be granted).
114 See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text.
115 More recently, private parties have collaborated to address government-sponsored use of
platforms to spread misinformation and promote division. See, e.g., Kate Conger & Sheera Frenkel,
How FireEye Helped Facebook Spot a Disinformation Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/technology/ﬁreeye-facebook-disinformation.html (discussing
collaboration to remove accounts linked to Russian and Iranian state actors).
116 NOVETTA, OPERATION SMN: AXIOM THREAT ACTOR GROUP REPORT 4 (2014),
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2NGM-7EAX].
117 Id. For additional analysis of the report, see Kristen Eichensehr, The Private Frontline in
Cybersecurity Oﬀense and Defense, JUST SEC. (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/16907/
private-frontline-cybersecurity-oﬀense-defense [https://perma.cc/N5UG-PVDJ].
118 NOVETTA, supra note 116, at 5-6.
119 See DJ Summers, As Cyber Attacks Swell, a Move Toward Improved Industry Collaboration,
FORTUNE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/07/cybersecurity-collaboration [https://perma.cc/
HZL2-J6KW] (“Operation SMN marks the ﬁrst time that computer security players . . . are
bonding without using federal or international law enforcement agencies as glue.”).
120 Ellen Nakashima, Researchers Identify Sophisticated Chinese Cyberespionage Group, WASH.
POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/researchersidentify-sophisticated-chinese-cyberespionage-group/2014/10/27/de30bc9a-5e00-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_
story.html [https://perma.cc/JG99-CX3P] (quoting Stephen Ward, Senior Director, iSight Partners).
121 See BOTNET LEGAL NOTICE, http://www.botnetlegalnotice.com [https://perma.cc/US5N-CP3K]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (collecting court filings and orders related to various takedowns in which Microsoft
has been involved). Microsoft is the most prominent, but not the only, company that has engaged in takedown
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networks of computers infected with malicious software that allows them to
be controlled remotely and used for a variety of activities, including denial of
service attacks, spam distribution, and fraud.122 To stop botnets, Microsoft
has ﬁled numerous civil lawsuits in federal district courts against botnet
operators, arguing that botnets that use Microsoft products harm Microsoft
and its customers and raising claims of unauthorized access to protected
computers and trademark infringement.123 Courts have permitted Microsoft
to seize control of and eﬀectively deactivate botnets.124 Microsoft used similar
legal theories in a lawsuit to disrupt Russian government election-related
hacking.125 The resort to the court system to eﬀectuate these endeavors does
not render them less state-like: when the U.S. government has done botnet
takedowns, it has similarly ﬁled civil suits to obtain court orders allowing it
to seize control of botnet infrastructure.126 In its crime control eﬀorts,
Microsoft is acting like U.S. federal law enforcement.127
In recent years, companies have also begun to make public policy proposals,
and not just any proposals: ones that would systematically elevate the role of
companies and other nongovernmental actors and decrease the role of
operations. See, e.g., Michael Mimoso, Facebook Carries Out Lecpetex Botnet Takedown, THREATPOST (July 9,
2014, 11:08 AM), http://threatpost.com/facebook-carries-out-lecpetex-botnet-takedown/107096
[https://perma.cc/LWG5-YQ5S] (describing Facebook’s takedown of a botnet).
122 See, e.g., What Is a Botnet?, NORTON, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malwarewhat-is-a-botnet.html [https://perma.cc/GRP6-RDJZ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (describing botnets
in general); see also Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive East Coast Internet
Outage, WIRED (Oct. 21, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddos-dns-dyn
[https://perma.cc/PM3N-HHKP] (discussing the Mirai botnet that was used in a distributed denial
of service (DDOS) attack against Dyn).
123 See, e.g., Complaint at 11-12, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1-5, No. 15-cv-06565 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 23, 2015) (discussing how the Dorkbot botnet harms Microsoft and its customers); id. at 13-15
(raising unauthorized access and trademark-related claims).
124 See, e.g., Order Granting Default Judgment & Permanent Injunction, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does
1-82 at 9-12, No. 3:13-cv-00319 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2013) (granting Microsoft a permanent injunction and
transferring ownership of malicious domains to Microsoft). In some cases, Microsoft works with government
officials in takedown operations. See, e.g., Press Release, Europol, Andromeda Botnet Dismantled in
International Cyber Operation (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/
andromeda-botnet-dismantled-in-international-cyber-operation [https://perma.cc/4APS-RGCM] (detailing
cooperation by U.S. and foreign law enforcement and Microsoft to take down the Andromeda botnet).
125 See supra note 113; see also Lily Hay Newman, How Microsoft Tackles Russian Hackers—And
Why It’s Never Enough, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/microsoftrussia-fancy-bear-hackers-sinkhole-phishing [https://perma.cc/M9BP-K7L5] (discussing Microsoft’s
suit permitting it to seize domains and sinkhole traffic); David E. Sanger & Sheera Frenkel, New Russian
Hacking Targeted Republican Groups, Microsoft Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/21/us/politics/russia-cyber-hack.html (reporting that Microsoft discovered websites
designed to mimic Republican groups and that a court-appointed special master permitted Microsoft
to “seize fake websites as soon as they are registered”).
126 See Eichensehr, supra note 74, at 480 (discussing the Coreﬂood botnet takedown).
127 Sometimes Microsoft has acted not just like, but with, federal law enforcement. See id. at
480-81 (discussing public–private collaboration on the Citadel and ZeroAccess botnet takedowns).
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governments. For example, Microsoft has proposed the establishment of an
international institution to handle attribution of cyberattacks to nation-states.128
Microsoft suggests modeling the institution on the International Atomic Energy
Agency and having its membership “consist of technical experts from across
governments, the private sector, academia, and civil society with the capability to
examine tactics, techniques, and procedures used by nation-state attackers, as well
as indicators of compromise that suggest a given attack was by a nation-state.”129
Experts have raised questions about the feasibility of the proposal, but also
acknowledge that such a body could “help to a considerable extent address the
politicization of many attribution judgments today.”130 A recent Microsoft-funded
study by the RAND Corporation went further, proposing a Global Cyber
Attribution Consortium that would entirely exclude governments.131
Even more recently, as the culmination of a push by Microsoft President
Brad Smith, more than sixty tech companies from the United States and
Western Europe signed a Cybersecurity Tech Accord.132 The Accord commits
the companies to “strive to protect all of [their] users and customers from
cyberattacks . . . irrespective of their technical acumen, culture or location, or
the motives of the attacker, whether criminal or geopolitical.”133 The
signatories also vow that they “will not help governments launch cyberattacks
against innocent citizens and enterprises from anywhere.”134 Signatories
128 SCOTT CHARNEY ET AL., MICROSOFT, FROM ARTICULATION TO IMPLEMENTATION:
ENABLING PROGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY NORMS 11-12 (2016), https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/
cms/api/am/binary/REVmc8 [https://perma.cc/H57G-GR46].
129 Id. at 11.
130 Herb Lin, Microsoft Proposes an Independent Body for Making Attribution Judgments, LAWFARE
(June 24, 2016, 3:50 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/microsoft-proposes-independent-bodymaking-attribution-judgments [https://perma.cc/D53U-6WAL].
131 JOHN S. DAVIS II ET AL., RAND CORP., STATELESS ATTRIBUTION: TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CYBERSPACE vi, 27, 30-31 (2017), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html [https://perma.cc/4BWC-VXXW].
132 About Cybersecurity Tech Accord, CYBERSECURITY TECH ACCORD, https://cybertechaccord.org/
about [https://perma.cc/W9D8-GZ8T] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); see also Chris Bing, Microsoft-Led
Industry Group Pledges to Not Assist Government Cyberattacks, CYBERSCOOP (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.cyberscoop.com/microsoft-brad-smith-cyber-norms-rsa-2018 [https://perma.cc/4PT3-6JN4]
(describing the Accord and noting that Microsoft led the eﬀort to gain agreement from other
companies); Sanger, supra note 79 (“The impetus for the eﬀort came largely from Mr. Smith, who
has been arguing for several years that the world needs a ‘digital Geneva Convention’ that sets norms
of behavior for cyberspace . . . .”).
133 Cybersecurity Tech Accord, CYBERSECURITY TECH ACCORD, https://cybertechaccord.org/accord
[https://perma.cc/Y586-QBN8] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
134 Id.; see Sanger, supra note 79 (noting that this commitment “reﬂect[s] Silicon Valley’s eﬀort
to separate itself from government cyberwarfare”). The Accord preserves, however, some ﬂexibility.
For example, who determines who counts as an “innocent” civilian? Cf. SANGER, supra note 42, at
306-07 (praising the Accord but raising critiques, including that the wording “left lots of
maneuvering room for the companies to join attacks against terror groups, or even against
governments repressing their own citizens”).
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include Cisco, Microsoft, Facebook, FireEye, and Symantec, as well as Nokia
from Finland and Telefónica from Spain.135
When considered based on the size of their “constituencies,” ﬁnancial
resources, and ability to counter criminal and governmental cyberthreats, the
comparison between major U.S. technology companies and countries seems
not unfounded. There is no doubt that the companies are both powerful and
sophisticated actors in the international sphere.
Motivations. In addition to these practical similarities to states, the
technology companies may be similar to governments in a more theoretical
way as well, namely in the mixed motivations that drive their actions. The
companies, like states, are multimember entities, with different internal actors
pushing along the ship of “state.” Differing motivations drive different—and
competing—internal actors who in turn shape company behavior and may
push the companies to act consistent with the Digital Switzerlands idea.
One possible explanation for the companies’ behavior is economic: the
companies may assess that the posture of neutrality will best maximize their
growth and proﬁts going forward by increasing their appeal to users
worldwide.136 Economic incentives are certainly at play in virtually all
company behavior. For corporate oﬃcers, ignoring the companies’ economic
interests would be a dereliction of duties to shareholders.137 But this realist
account isn’t the only possible explanation or necessarily a total one.
A competing explanation would focus on the moral and normative
commitments of individuals within the companies: when important corporate
decisionmakers or other employees who play key roles are personally
committed to values like user privacy or transparency, they can drive the
company, for example, to resist government demands to weaken privacy.138
135 Sanger, supra note 79; Signing Pledge to Fight Cyberattacks, 34 Leading Companies Promise Equal
Protection for Customers Worldwide, CYBERSECURITY TECH ACCORD (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://cybertechaccord.org/signing-pledge-to-fight-attacks-cyber-accord [https://perma.cc/8AMD-YTA6].
136 See Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with This Court’s February 16,
2016 Order Compelling Assistance in Search at 2-3, In re the Search of an Apple Iphone Seized
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. CM 16-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
19, 2016) (“Apple’s current refusal to comply with the Court’s Order . . . appears to be based on its
concern for its business model and public brand marketing strategy.”); cf. Kate Klonick, The New
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1627-30
(2018) (discussing the economic incentives that drive technology companies to implement content
moderation policies that will meet user expectations).
137 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—More Data, More Problems, supra note 60, at 1730 & n.51
(noting that for companies incorporated in Delaware, as many of the tech companies are,
“generat[ing] proﬁts for [their] shareholders . . . is . . . the bedrock principle that is supposed to
animate every decision” (footnote omitted)).
138 See Eichensehr, supra note 74, at 503-04 (discussing the role of community attachments in
motivating the behavior of corporate employees in cybersecurity); Finnemore & Hollis, supra note
14, at 461 (highlighting the “cultural norms” that “dispose technologists toward particular views of the
role that digital technology can or should play in society”); Klonick, supra note 136, at 1618-22
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Battles over public-law values are happening inside companies and appear to
have prompted the resignation of at least one high-proﬁle employee.139
Yet another explanation might focus on the culture of Silicon Valley and
the eﬀects on particular companies or decisionmakers within those companies
of being embedded in a milieu that values privacy and security.140
Still another explanation might merge these possibilities, suggesting that
companies sometimes act in accordance with the proprivacy, transparency, or other
normative commitments of important employees to retain their loyalty and
services, which in turn maximizes the companies’ success in the long run. For
example, a values-based push by Google employees for the company to cease work
on artificial intelligence for a U.S. military targeting program led to resignations,141
(discussing how the First Amendment values held by technology company decisionmakers, especially
lawyers, shape the companies’ content moderation policies); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 714-15 (2018) (discussing a
“movement among engineers and designers to be more conscious of the values embedded in the
systems they design” and “to address values more systematically in technical practice”).
139 See Frenkel et al., supra note 18 (providing a detailed account of conﬂict within Facebook
over security and election interference); Nicole Perlroth, Sheera Frenkel, & Scott Shane, Facebook Exit
Hints at Dissent on Handling of Russian Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/19/technology/facebook-alex-stamos.html (reporting that Facebook’s Chief Information
Security Oﬃcer, Alex Stamos, made plans to leave the company after pushing unsuccessfully for
“more disclosure around Russian interference of the platform” and explaining that “[o]ne central
tension at Facebook has been” between the “security team[, which] generally pushed for more
disclosure about how nation states had misused the site,” and “the legal and policy teams[, which]
have prioritized business imperatives”). Resignations as a tool to protest an entity’s failure to live up to public
values present another metasimilarity between tech companies and governments as resignation-in-protest
is often associated with government officials. See, e.g., David Johnston, Bush Intervened in Dispute over
N.S.A. Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/
washington/16nsa.html (detailing an episode in which Justice Department officials threatened to
resign rather than reauthorize a surveillance program); Oona Hathaway, Work for the Trump
Administration? Yes, but Be Prepared, JUST SEC. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/
34409/work-trump-administration-yes-prepared [https://perma.cc/65QE-FWLN] (discussing the
“power of public servants to resign—publicly and prominently—when they are asked to formulate or
implement abusive policies”). For an extended treatment of resignations in protest by government
officials, see generally EDWARD WEISBAND & THOMAS M. FRANCK, RESIGNATION IN PROTEST:
POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CHOICES BETWEEN LOYALTY TO TEAM AND LOYALTY TO
CONSCIENCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1975).
140 See Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 14, at 442 (identifying a “culture of Silicon Valley” that
emphasizes security and privacy); see also RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING
STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2013) (identifying
“material inducement” and “persuasion” as mechanisms that inﬂuence state behavior and proposing
the addition of “acculturation,” deﬁned as “the process by which actors adopt the beliefs and
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture, without actively assessing either the merits of those
beliefs and behaviors or the material costs and beneﬁts of conforming to them”).
141 See Kate Conger, Google Employees Resign in Protest Against Pentagon Contract, GIZMODO (May 14,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/google-employees-resign-in-protest-against-pentagon-con-1825729300
[https://perma.cc/ARN8-YQMH]; see also Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘The Business of
War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html (noting that more than 3000 employees
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and ultimately Google backed down, announcing that it would not renew the
contract.142
Consideration of values-based explanations for the companies’ behavior is
thus fully consistent with a realist explanation focused on the companies’
economic interests. Like the Swiss neutrality on which it is modeled, the Digital
Switzerlands idea is partly principled and partly strategic. Principle and strategy
can point in the same direction: taking actions to maintain long-term trust in the
digital ecosystem encourages greater use of the Internet and the companies’
products, while also supporting ideological commitments to privacy and security.
All of these possibilities (and probably others) have some purchase, but
none has a monopoly on explanatory value. And this mixture of possible or
partial explanations for company behavior should not be surprising.
International relations and international law scholars have long debated how
best to explain state behavior, particularly diverging on the extent to which
states are driven by interests versus ideas.143 The existence of similar competing
or complementary explanations—profit interests versus privacy ideals—for
companies adds further impetus to take seriously the company-to-sovereign
analogy. At the same time, however, the persistence of theoretical debates about
state behavior suggests that a definitive resolution to similar debates about
technology companies will also remain elusive.144

signed a letter to Google’s CEO protesting Google’s work for the Pentagon and explaining that although
“[a]n uneasiness about military contracts among a small fraction of Google’s more than 70,000 employees
may not pose a major obstacle to the company’s growth[,] . . . in the rarefied area of artificial intelligence
research, Google is engaged in intense competition . . . for the most talented people”).
142 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract that
Upset Employees, N.Y. T IMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/
google-pentagon-project-maven.html. The companies’ positions on work for the U.S. military vary.
See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Microsoft Says It Will Sell Pentagon Artificial Intelligence and Other Advanced
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/us/politics/ai-microsoftpentagon.html (reporting that, unlike Google, Microsoft will compete for a Pentagon cloud computing
contract and that Microsoft President Brad Smith “would not indicate whether Microsoft would also
provide all of its products to, say, the [Chinese] People’s Liberation Army,” saying only that “‘It’s an issue
we are going to have to work through’” (quoting Brad Smith)); Nitasha Tiku, Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Says
Tech Companies Should Work with the Pentagon, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://www.wired.com/
story/amazons-jeﬀ-bezos-says-tech-companies-should-work-with-the-pentagon [https://perma.cc/
PJ9V-NVBM] (“If big tech companies are going to turn their back on [the] US Department of
Defense, this country is going to be in trouble.” (quoting Amazon CEO Jeﬀ Bezos)).
143 See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS 111 (2005) (“How and why ideas matter, and the extent to which they influence
international relations and international law, remains a source of disagreement.”). For overviews of
competing theories, see, for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner,
International Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645, 657-78 (1998), and Richard
H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 71-85 (2006).
144 See, e.g., Steinberg & Zasloﬀ, supra note 143, at 86 (“None of the metatheories of the last
century have been able to deliver the knockout blow that some may have once thought possible. No
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Where Parity Falls Short. Despite these similarities to states, the companies
still lack core attributes of sovereignty traditionally understood to deﬁne the
essence of statehood.
One classic deﬁnition of a state is Max Weber’s: “[A] state is a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory.”145 Territory, according to Weber, “is one
of the characteristics of the state.”146 And it is one that the companies lack.147
Some have massive headquarters complexes,148 but all are located within
sovereign states. The relevant monopolizers of legitimate use of physical force
are governments, not the companies.
Another key feature of states is sovereignty.149 Although “sovereignty has
always been a plastic norm in practice,”150 Stephen Krasner has identiﬁed four
distinct types of sovereignty:151 (1) “International legal sovereignty”
encompasses “the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually
between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence”;152 (2)
“Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the
exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given

one trying to understand international relations can ignore power, or law, or the state, or civil
society, or norms, or language.”).
145 MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1958). This, of course, is not the
only possible deﬁnition of statehood. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 18, at 1817-19 (comparing
Facebook to the international law criteria for a state, as set out in Article 1 of the Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, including that it “possess . . . : (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The definitions, however, are largely overlapping, creating similar
ways across definitions in which the tech companies may meet and fail in equivalence with states.
146 WEBER, supra note 145, at 78.
147 See Chander, supra note 18, at 1817 (“Facebook obviously lacks . . . a deﬁned territory.”). But
see Cohen, supra note 18, at 200 (“[P]latforms have both territories and populations. Platform
territories are not contiguous physical spaces but rather are deﬁned using protocols, data ﬂows, and
algorithms. Both technically and experientially, however, they are clearly demarcated spaces with
virtual borders that platforms guard vigilantly.”).
148 See, e.g., Julie Balise, Office Space: Google’s Campus Feels as Big as the Internet Itself, SFGATE
(Jan. 5, 2015, 1:23 PM PST), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Office-Space-Google-s-campusfeels-as-big-as-5992389.php [https://perma.cc/5AZ9-2QCN?type=image] (describing Google’s Bay-area
headquarters and noting its size as “[b]ig, but Google wouldn’t say how big”); Jennifer Warnick, 88
Acres: How Microsoft Quietly Built the City of the Future, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/
en-us/stories/88acres [https://perma.cc/73RY-RZ3T] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (noting that
Microsoft’s campus in Redmond, Washington now encompasses 500 acres).
149 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 220 (1999) (“The
bundle of properties associated with sovereignty—territory, recognition, autonomy, and control—have
been understood, often implicitly, to characterize states in the international system.”).
150 Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 401 (2000).
151 KRASNER, supra note 149, at 3; see id. at 9-25 (explaining the four conceptions of sovereignty).
152 Id. at 3.
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territory”;153 (3) “[d]omestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of
political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to
exercise eﬀective control within the borders of their own polity”;154 and (4)
“interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to
regulate the ﬂow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital
across the borders of their state.”155 These characteristics of sovereignty are
often honored only in the breach, and as Krasner himself notes, “only a very
few states have possessed all of these attributes.”156
The fact that states can survive and continue to be recognized as states
even absent some of the characteristics of sovereignty is, however, little help
to the companies. To date, the companies possess none of these types of
sovereignty. Countries do not recognize them as states, and they lack “juridical
independence.”157 They lack authority to exclude governmental officials from
their premises. They are also subordinate to public authorities and legal
regimes within the states in which they operate. They may come closest to
possessing interdependence sovereignty: the companies cannot regulate all
information, goods, or people that cross an international border—such borders
are not theirs to police. But considered from the perspective of individuals,
the companies may effectively represent a supplemental sovereign, in addition
to the territorial sovereign.158
*

*

*

Companies approach parity with states on some aspects of practical
power. They have enormous user bases and state-like ﬁnancial resources, and
they have begun acting like states, engaging in crime control and public policy.
Explaining their motivations also poses challenges similar to those that have
long bedeviled theorists of state behavior. But the companies lack the formal
attributes of statehood and sovereignty. They do not possess sovereign

153 Id. at 3-4; see also Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1845 (2009) (“In international law,
‘sovereignty’ signifies the idea that a state or a nation exercises effective and supreme control within
a territory and is formally independent of any external or superior authority structure, including other
states and international organizations.”).
154 KRASNER, supra note 149, at 4.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 220.
157 Id. at 3.
158 See infra Section III.A (discussing the effect of multiple “sovereigns”); cf. Pasquale, supra note
6 (arguing, based on a domestic context, that “major digital firms . . . aspire to displace more
government roles over time, replacing the logic of territorial sovereignty with functional sovereignty”).
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territory, are not recognized by sovereigns as sovereign, and remain subject
to the overriding public authorities in countries where they operate.159
Those features may, of course, evolve. On the recognition-by-states-as-states
front, the companies have employees that function as ambassadors to
governments,160 and one country—Denmark—has appointed a diplomat as
“tech ambassador,” resident in Silicon Valley.161 In announcing the tech
ambassador position, Danish Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen explained
that the U.S. technology companies “affect Denmark just as much as entire
countries” and “have become a type of new nations.”162
B. Neutrality
The second idea embedded in the “Digital Switzerland” concept is that the
technology companies are not just akin to countries but to neutral countries.
Even more than the claim of parity, promoting the idea of their own neutrality
serves the companies’ interests. The markets for the companies’ products are
increasingly international. For a number of the companies, the majority of their
revenue already comes from non-U.S. sources.163 For 2017, for example, Alphabet
(Google’s parent company) derived only with 47% of its revenue from the United
159 Cf. SEGAL, supra note 44, at 27 (“Nation-states still regulate the companies that create the
hardware and software of cyberspace; threaten, imprison, ﬁne, and monitor individual users; develop
competing technology standards; and require that the physical infrastructure of the Internet be
conﬁgured to give them more control.”).
160 See Cyrus Farivar, Mr. Ambassador, Meet President Zuckerberg, SLATE (May 27, 2011, 12:31
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2011/05/mr_ambassador_meet_president_
zuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/643Y-EMFS] (reporting that Facebook and Google have sent
employees to act as emissaries to foreign governments).
161 See Denmark Names First Ever Digital Ambassador for Silicon Valley Role, LOCAL (Den.) (May
26, 2017, 18:02 CEST), https://www.thelocal.dk/20170526/denmark-names-first-ever-digitalambassador-for-silicon-valley-role [https://perma.cc/GJ8U-XT4J] (reporting the appointment of
Denmark’s ambassador to Indonesia, Casper Klynge, as the “tech ambassador”). Such diplomacy is
not one sided. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 202 (“Platforms . . . increasingly practice diplomacy in
the manner of sovereign actors. Facebook’s privacy team travels the world meeting with government
oﬃcials to determine how best to satisfy their concerns while continuing to advance Facebook’s own
interests, much as a secretary of state and his or her staﬀ might do.”).
162 Robbie Gramer, Denmark Creates the World’s First Ever Digital Ambassador, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
27, 2017, 2:37 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/27/denmark-creates-the-worlds-first-ever-digitalambassador-technology-europe-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/5KGX-NUXY] (quoting interview with
Samuelsen in Politiken, a Danish newspaper).
163 Twitter is an exception. In 2017, Twitter’s total revenue amounted to $2.44 billion, of which
$1.41 billion (57.79%) came from the United States. Twitter 10-K, supra note 104, at 46. Microsoft’s
U.S.-derived revenue hovers around 50%. For the ﬁscal year ending in June 2016, 47.6% of
Microsoft’s revenue came from the United States. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form
10-K) 93 (July 28, 2016) (showing total revenue for ﬁscal year 2016 of $85,320 million, of which only
$40,578 million (or 47.6%) came from the United States). The percentage has increased slightly since
then. See Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 94 (Aug. 3, 2018) (showing total revenue for
ﬁscal year 2018 of $110,360 million, of which $55,926 million (or 50.7%) came from the United States).
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States.164 For Apple, the comparable figures are even lower: only 36.8% of Apple’s
net sales revenue came from the United States for the fiscal year ending in
September 2017.165 The markets for the companies’ products are also not just
private parties. The companies do business with governments around the world.166
If market is considered based on user location rather than revenue, it is
equally true that the markets for the companies’ products are more
international than domestic. In December 2017, Facebook had 2.13 billion
monthly active users, of whom only 239 million came from the United States
or Canada,167 and Twitter had 330 million monthly active users, of whom only
68 million were in the United States.168
The markets are also likely to be increasingly international. As Adam
Segal put it, “the future of cyberspace is not American, at least in terms of its
users.”169 The growth potential for Internet users and smartphone owners
outside the United States is far higher than within the United States. For
example, Asia includes 55.1% of the world’s population, but the Internet
penetration rate there (the percentage of the population that uses the
Internet) is only 49%, suggesting that there is an enormous population of
potential Internet users who have yet to connect.170 North America, by
contrast, contains 4.8% of the world’s population and already has an Internet
penetration rate of 95%, meaning a far smaller pool of potential Internet users
could come online there going forward.171
164 Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 32 (Feb. 6, 2018); see also id. at 27 (showing
revenues of $52.4 billion from the United States, out of a total of $110.9 billion, and explaining that
of the $110.9 billion, $109.7 billion derives from Google).
165 See Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 68 (Nov. 3, 2017) (showing $84,339 million in
net sales from the United States out of a total of $229,234 million in net sales in 2017 (36.8%)).
166 See, e.g., Kris Cheng, Gov’t to Continue Using Microsoft Email System Instead of Chinese One
After Contract Granted to Shenzhen Firm, H.K. FREE PRESS (May 9, 2018, 20:49),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/05/09/govt-continue-using-microsoft-email-system-instead-chinese-onecontract-granted-shenzhen-firm [https://perma.cc/3Q2W-XBMS] (reporting that the Hong Kong
government uses Microsoft Exchange for email); Media Release, Nat’l Treasury, S. Afr., Office of the Chief
Procurement Officer Join Forces to Reduce Costs and Enhance Efficiency in the Public Sector (Dec. 9,
2016), http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2016/2016121201%20Media%20release%20Microsoft%
20SITA%20TREASURY.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCD4-EXAS] (noting renegotiation of South African
government contracts with Microsoft); Dara Kerr, Apple Lands $159M Government Contract for iPhone, iPad,
CNET (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:13 PM PST), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-lands-159m-government-contractfor-iphone-ipad (reporting Apple contract with New Zealand police).
167 Facebook provides an aggregate ﬁgure for the United States and Canada. See Facebook,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Feb. 1, 2018).
168 Twitter 10-K, supra note 104, at 47.
169 SEGAL, supra note 44, at 35.
170 World Internet Users and 2018 Population Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [https://perma.cc/3WUB-Z5MY] (last updated June 30, 2018).
171 Id.; cf. Governing Intelligence, supra note 64, at 19:20 (statement of Scott Charney, Corporate
Vice President, Microsoft Corp.) (“[Four-point-ﬁve] percent—that is the percentage of the world
population in the United States. The next two billion people coming online will not be here.”). For
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The evolving demographics of the companies’ customer and user bases
drive the companies’ apparent desire (or perceived need) to treat all
governments equally. To appeal to the international users who will be key to
their future growth, the U.S. technology companies are trying to shed or at
least significantly downplay their origins and continued legal personality as U.S.
companies. Instead, they cast themselves as neutrals amidst competing claims
by national governments and in the face of claims by the U.S. government for
preferential treatment because of their status as U.S. companies.
For example, in resisting a court order requiring it to write code to allow the
FBI to access the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino shooters, Apple argued
that it could not comply with the U.S. government’s demand without acceding
to similar requests from other governments.172 In other words, to maintain its
neutrality, Apple could not (even if it wanted to) do something that would be
perceived as exceptional for the U.S. government. Treating the U.S.
government in an exceptional manner would doom the company in international
markets or put it in the position of having to grant all governments the same
type of assistance and access—an option Apple rejected on security grounds.173
Microsoft oﬃcials have made similar arguments. Microsoft Corporate
Vice President Scott Charney argued: “[W]hen one country attacks another
country, . . . for us, that’s one customer attacking another customer. And
either customer might ask us for support and help.”174 Charney argued that
in that circumstance, Microsoft has “to be Switzerland” and “do defense and
not oﬀense.”175 Brad Smith’s RSA speech echoes a similar argument for
resisting demands, even by a company’s national government. Smith argued:
“[W]e will not aid in attacking customers anywhere, regardless of the
government that may ask us to do so.”176
The recent Cybersecurity Tech Accord also reﬂects this concept of
neutrality as a lack of exceptionalism. The signatory companies pledge not to
help governments launch cyberattacks, full stop, with no carveout for the
United States or other governments.177 And their commitment to protect
users who suﬀer attacks “irrespective of . . . the motives of the attacker,
statistics on Internet penetration rates, broken down by country, see Jacob Poushter, Smartphone
Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb.
22, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-internet-usage-continuesto-climb-in-emerging-economies [https://perma.cc/Y3JH-FWPE].
172 Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 52, at 2 (“[O]nce developed for our
government, it is only a matter of time before foreign governments demand the same tool.”).
173 Id.
174 Governing Intelligence, supra note 64, at 17:40 (statement of Scott Charney, Corporate Vice
President, Microsoft Corp.).
175 Id. at 17:58 (statement of Scott Charney, Corporate Vice President, Microsoft Corp.).
176 Smith, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added).
177 Cybersecurity Tech Accord, supra note 133.
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whether criminal or geopolitical” similarly suggests that a user under attack
by the U.S. government would receive the same assistance to thwart the
intrusion as one under attack by, for example, Russia.178
The move among U.S. technology companies to treat the United States
as just one among many governments has undoubtedly been an unwelcome
development for the U.S. government. As Jon Michaels has documented, in
the wake of the September 11 attacks, numerous U.S. companies were willing
to provide voluntary informal assistance to the government on intelligence
collection,179 often based on appeals to patriotism.180 Such techniques are now
less eﬀective. Not only has the environment shifted dramatically since the
Snowden disclosures, but appeals to patriotism are less eﬀectual when
deployed against companies that are trying to denationalize and globalize.
Neutrality essentially means a most (or perhaps least) favored-nation
approach to governments: there will be no exceptional treatment for the United
States, and companies will only do for the U.S. government that which they are
willing to do for all governments. Conversely, if the companies are not willing to
do something for any government, they will also not do it for the United States.
The companies’ appeal to neutrality does a fair job, whether intentionally or
not, of echoing basic international law rights and duties of neutral states.181
International law on neutrality is part of customary international law, and it is also
codified in treaties.182 Neutrality law does not apply directly to the companies
Id.
See Michaels, supra note 43, at 910-16 (detailing voluntary assistance provided by Western
Union and FedEx, among others).
180 Id. at 928.
181 Smith’s speech invokes the concept of neutrality, but unlike other sections of the speech that
reference international treaties, the speech does not specifically mention neutrality law. See Smith,
supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the Fourth Geneva Convention, relating to protection of civilians in
armed conflict). The international law of neutrality is not the only extant idea of neutrality. Compare,
for example, net neutrality. See generally ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40616,
THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE: ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS (2017), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R40616.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HH3-J6HP] (providing an overview of net neutrality
regulatory debates and action). However, it seems to be the one most directly on point for two reasons.
First, given that the companies are invoking states as comparators, the international law of neutrality
appears to be the most directly analogous, casting states as the prime actors rather than companies, as
in the case of net neutrality. Second, the international law of neutrality seems the most likely referent
from Smith’s speech itself, other portions of which reference the Geneva Conventions, which are
foundational treaties on the law of armed conflict. See Smith, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the Fourth
Geneva Convention). Given this context, understanding references to neutrality to invoke the
neutrality applicable in international armed conflict is a small step.
182 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 553 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] (noting that
the law of neutrality “is based on Hague Conventions V and XIII and customary international law”);
see also Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 2322-25 [hereinafter Hague Convention V]; Convention
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 2427.
178
179
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because it operates on states and applies during international armed conflict—a
circumstance much narrower than the peacetime applicability the companies
seek.183 Nonetheless, the companies’ apparent interpretation of the meaning of
neutrality both for states and for the companies invokes similar principles.
For countries, neutrality law prohibits states that are parties to an armed
conflict from taking certain actions against or on the territory of a neutral state,
or using facilities within the neutral state. Most basically, the nationals of states
that are not party to the conflict are neutrals,184 and the territory of a neutral
state is “inviolable.”185 In addition, parties to the conflict cannot move
“munitions of war or supplies” through neutral territory or erect
communications facilities in a neutral state.186 Brad Smith’s call to governments
sounds similar. He argues that governments should not take actions that
undermine trust in the global information technology infrastructure187 and that
they should “pledge that they will not engage in cyberattacks on the private
sector, that they will not target civilian infrastructure.”188 These invocations
suggest that the tech companies and their customers should potentially benefit
from a double immunity from attack—the immunity afforded to neutrals in an
armed conflict and the immunity afforded to civilians.189
Neutrality law imposes corresponding obligations on neutral states, and the
companies’ words and actions echo those obligations too. The companies suggest
that as neutral Digital Switzerlands, they will treat all governments equally,
giving no government preferential treatment or a free pass to attack users.190
Similarly, neutrality law requires that if a neutral country takes certain measures
to, for example, restrict one warring party’s access to communications facilities,
it must do the same for all of the warring parties.191 The companies’ emphasis on
183 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 182, at 553 (“The law of neutrality applies only during
international armed conﬂict.”).
184 Hague Convention V art. 16, supra note 182, at 2325.
185 Id. art. 1 at 2322.
186 Id. art. 2 at 2322 (“Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions
of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.”); id. art. 3 at 2322 (prohibiting belligerents
from, inter alia, erecting military communications facilities in neutral states).
187 See Smith, supra note 1, at 13-14 (“[W]e need to persuade every government that it needs a
national and global IT infrastructure that it can trust. And the only way it can have that is if it knows
that our industry is focused on protecting everyone everywhere, and attacking or assisting in
attacking no one, anywhere, at any time.”).
188 Id. at 10.
189 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 (“The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack.”); see also Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
115, 117 (2010) (“The foundational principle of distinction . . . grants immunity to civilians.”).
190 See supra notes 64–68, 177–78 and accompanying text (discussing companies’ positions).
191 See Hague Convention V art. 8, supra note 182, at 2323 (“A neutral Power is not called upon
to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of
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playing defense—plugging vulnerabilities and protecting customers from
attacks—also sounds in neutrality law. Neutral countries cannot allow violations
of their neutrality, and in some circumstances, they have an affirmative obligation
to respond to violations of their neutrality.192 Neutrality in both the traditional
context and the new company-centric one can be armed neutrality.193 In
conceptualizing neutrality, the companies are not just calling on states to respect
their neutrality, but they appear to be voluntarily assuming obligations akin to
those that international law imposes on neutral states.
For all their efforts to appear neutral, however, the companies have not yet
achieved—and quite likely will never succeed in achieving—perfect neutrality.
They are still strongly associated with the United States, where they remain
domiciled and maintain their headquarters. They remain subject to legal process
and legal compulsion not just in the United States but in every country where
they have assets and operations. This point is key because it ensures that the
companies sometimes face a choice between either exiting certain markets or
bowing to demands of territorial governments enforcing local laws.194
Switzerland itself, as a sovereign recognized by other sovereigns, does not face
a comparable choice between exit and subordination. In all of these ways, the
companies’ lack of perfect parity with states not only undermines their claim to
parity, but also jeopardizes their ability to be neutral.
Moreover, a posture of neutrality carries with it a risk of undue passivity,
tending toward complicity. Switzerland itself fell prey to this risk in World War
II. Switzerland’s constitution enshrines duties for legislative and executive
bodies to safeguard the country’s neutrality,195 but an Independent Commission
of Experts, established by the Swiss government to examine Switzerland’s
actions during World War II, concluded that in various ways Switzerland had

wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.”); id. art. 9 at
2323-24 (“Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in regard to the
matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents.”).
192 See id. art. 5 at 2323 (“A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles
2 to 4 to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless
the said acts have been committed on its own territory.”).
193 Cf. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & SWISS FED. COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER ON
NEUTRALITY 6 (1993), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/
White_Paper_on_Neutrality.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBG5-ACZY] (“Swiss neutrality is armed,
which means that Switzerland is determined to avail itself of every means at its disposal to defend
itself militarily against any aggressor and to prevent any act incompatible with its neutrality that
belligerents may seek to perpetrate on its territory.” (emphasis omitted)).
194 See infra Section II.C (discussing the limits of the Digital Switzerlands concept, including
circumstances in which companies comply with local law).
195 See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 173, para. 1
(Switz.) (obliging the Federal Assembly to safeguard the country’s neutrality); id. art. 185, para. 1
(obliging the Federal Council to safeguard the country’s neutrality).
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compromised its neutrality.196 For example, while not necessarily technically
violating prevailing international law,197 the conduct of “business as usual” with
German banks “enabled Germany . . . to acquire foreign currency which could
then be used to obtain essential goods for its war economy.”198
Embracing a pose of neutrality as a justification for “business as usual”—even
if legally permissible—may nonetheless engender justifiable criticism for
complicity in governmental action.199 Social media companies’ failure to prevent
use of their platforms by agents of the Russian government in the 2016 election
cycle falls in this category.200
Although the companies’ analogy to neutrality law is imperfect, it remains
intriguing and may provide a principled platform for engagement with
governments going forward, as well as a cautionary tale to avoid complicity
in governmental conduct.
C. The Scope and Limits of Digital Switzerlands
Focusing on the companies’ shift from cooperation with to sometimes
countering governments pursuant to the Digital Switzerlands mantle is not
meant to suggest that they are models of virtue or unﬂinching defenders of
human rights. The fact that they are countering governments, especially the
U.S. government, at all in the claimed service of protecting users is notable,
new, and worth considering. But it is also limited.

196 The most reprehensible violations involved treatment of refugees. See INDEP. COMM’N OF
EXPERTS SWITZ.—SECOND WORLD WAR, SWITZERLAND, NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE
SECOND WORLD WAR: FINAL REPORT 499 (2002), https://www.uek.ch/en/schlussbericht/
synthesis/ueke.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V4H-RE22] (“[M]easured against its previous stand in terms
of humanitarian aid and asylum where its refugee policy was concerned, neutral Switzerland not
only failed to live up to its own standards, but also violated fundamental humanitarian principles.”).
197 See id. at 252 (explaining that although the transactions were defended on the ground “that
the gold purchases were required as a result of Switzerland’s neutrality,” “this is as unconvincing an
argument as the opposite view, often put forward by the Allies, that the purchases violated
Switzerland’s neutrality,” because “[i]n fact, neutrality neither prohibited nor required such
purchases: it merely permitted them”). Switzerland also purchased gold from the Allies, but as the
Report notes, such purchases were “not directly comparable to the purchases from Germany since
the Allied gold constituted a lawfully acquired means of payment and currency reserves.” Id. at 242.
198 Id. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
199 Cf. Adam J. White, Google.gov, NEW ATLANTIS, Spring 2018, at 3, 7-8 (noting, with respect
to Google’s alleged “neutrality” as a search engine, that “[t]he standard of neutrality is itself not
value-neutral but a moral standard of its own, suggesting a deeper ethos and aspiration about
information”); infra notes 211–14 (discussing the risks of operating in nondemocratic states).
200 Cf. Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary & the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 115th Cong.
(2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-10-18%20Zuckerberg%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7ZW-LDRH] (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer,
Facebook, Inc.) (“There’s no question that we should have spotted Russian interference earlier . . . .”).
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Importantly, the Digital Switzerlands concept does not directly address
the many concerns stemming from the role of the technology companies as
what Julie Cohen has called “surveillance principals in their own right,”201
amassers and exploiters of vast quantities of user-created data. And even as
to the government relationships about which the Digital Switzerland idea is
primarily concerned, the companies are not challenging governments all the
time, only some of the time, and they fall short of ideal levels of protection
for individuals. The companies are strategic in when they launch challenges,
including by doing so only when they have viable legal arguments. Exploring
the scope of the Digital Switzerlands idea—when it applies and when it
doesn’t—helps to clarify when and why companies attempt to counter
governments and when and why they don’t.
The companies are challenging governments in a generally coherent and
predictable pattern. The pattern of company challenges becomes clear when
the cyberspace ecosystem is understood as a triangle, composed of three
separate power centers: governments, technology companies, and users, as
illustrated in Figure 1 below.202
Figure 1: Triangulating When Tech Companies Fight and Fold

201 Cohen, supra note 18, at 194; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the
many concerning issues surrounding the companies’ relationship to users, including, for example,
exploitation of user data).
202 Others have suggested similar triadic framings in the service of other types of arguments.
See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School
Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1187-88 (2018) (describing a pluralist model of free
speech regulation that involves “at least three different groups”: “the state and supra-national entities
like the European Union,” “companies that operate the digital infrastructure, especially search engines
and social media platforms,” and “speakers who use the digital infrastructure to communicate”);
Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 122-30 (arguing for a triangular relationship of
governments, online service providers (OSPs), and citizens to illustrate the insufficiency of U.S.
constitutional law in remedying privacy harms caused by OSPs’ collaboration with governments).
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This model, like all models, is necessarily a simpliﬁcation.203 It reduces a
complex ecosystem to a few discrete points to isolate factors with explanatory
power. No point on the triangle—governments, companies, or users—is
monolithic,204 and instances where there are divergent interests within, for
example, users pose complications for the model, as discussed below.205
Nonetheless, the triangular framing is less simpliﬁed than the frequent focus
on only two points of the triangle—governments’ relationship to users,
governments’ relationship to companies, or companies’ relationship to
users.206 The triangular framing complicates these narratives by positing the
importance of alliances between power centers against other power centers.
The triangular framing helps to illustrate when companies, if they take
seriously the Digital Switzerlands idea, should ﬁght against governments, and
when they are likely to “fold” and comply without resisting. Stated generally,
the Digital Switzerlands concept suggests that companies will ﬁght against
or resist governments when the companies perceive themselves to be and can
credibly argue that they are protecting the interests of users against
governments, as illustrated in Figure 2.207 In the parlance of neutrality law, a
company’s users are akin to a state’s citizens, and thus attacks on the user
citizens are violations of neutrality.208 The companies determine users’
interests for themselves, and due to limited information or skewed

203 For example, the model does not explicitly address the role of international institutions, like
the United Nations, or of multistakeholder organizations, like the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) or the Internet Engineering Task Force, except to the extent that they
are a type of “user.” It also does not address the role of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
or Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). See, e.g., CERT-EU, EUR. UNION AGENCY
FOR NETWORK & INFO. SEC., https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/capacitybuilding/european-initiatives/cert-eu [https://perma.cc/SV7Y-KFDA] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). These
entities might plausibly argue that they are more neutral and Switzerland-like than tech companies.
But some of them do not deal with the security issues that this Article primarily addresses, and others,
particularly multistakeholder entities, have cross cutting memberships that incorporate representatives
from all points on the triangle. The model’s omission of these entities is not meant to downplay their
importance on many cyberspace-related issues; rather, it is simply an effort to isolate a set of
relationships between tech companies, users, and governments that are exerting exceptionally strong
influence in particular circumstances, as discussed in the remainder of this Section.
204 See, e.g., WOODS, supra note 18, at 2 (noting diﬀerences in willingness to challenge states
between hardware and data services ﬁrms and “consumer-facing” versus enterprise companies);
Developments in the Law—More Data, More Problems, supra note 60, at 1741 (discussing technology
companies as “surveillance intermediaries” and noting that they “are not a monolith,” but rather have
“diﬀerent user bases, business models, income streams, and public relations strategies”).
205 See infra notes 216–18.
206 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 12 (focusing on governments’ power to regulate
individuals); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1186 (2016) (focusing on companies’ relationships to users); Rahman, supra note 2 (same).
207 For an explanation of the motivations for this behavior, see supra Sections II.A–B.
208 See supra notes 186–93 and accompanying text (discussing neutrality law).
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perceptions, they may not always be correct in their assessments, sometimes
ﬁghting when they shouldn’t and failing to ﬁght when they should.
Paradigmatic easy cases where companies perceive an alignment with
users against governments—and where the model therefore provides clear
guidance for the companies—involve the preservation of technical security
measures, as in the Apple/FBI case, and the lawsuits that companies have
ﬁled in order to disclose government access to user content. In the latter cases,
the companies are claiming the mantle of user protection through
transparency and disclosure.
Figure 2: When Companies Fight

The triangular framing also suggests important contexts in which the
companies will not ﬁght governments. In particular, companies are most likely
to “fold” when, based on the companies’ assessment, there is an alliance
between users and governments, as illustrated in Figure 3. This category
includes many routine cases. For example, technology companies regularly
comply with requests to take down content in a variety of circumstances,
including government requests to take down content that violates local
laws.209 The companies also routinely comply when served with legal process
requiring them to produce the contents of user accounts.210
209 See, e.g., Government Requests to Remove Content, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/
government-removals/overview [https://perma.cc/478K-BBYW] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (explaining
that governments request content removals for, inter alia, violation of local law, and providing statistics
on the frequency and outcomes of such requests).
210 See, e.g., Legal Process for User Data Requests FAQs, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
transparencyreport/answer/7381738 [https://perma.cc/6MKA-HTW4] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019)
(explaining that the U.S. “government needs legal process—such as a subpoena, court order or search
warrant—to force Google to disclose user information”); Requests for User Information, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview [https://perma.cc/NG4Y-WP5W] (last visited
Feb. 8, 2019) (reporting that from July 1, 2016 through January 1, 2017, roughly sixty-ﬁve percent of
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Figure 3: When Companies Fold

One way companies appear to understand the existence of an alliance
between governments and users is government compliance with and attempts
to enforce democratically enacted laws. For example, countries around the world
have different understandings of the scope of free expression rights. Even
among Western democracies, there is longstanding and significant disagreement
over, for example, whether and how to regulate hate speech. The companies deal
with these variations by complying with local law in the countries in which they
operate, which means the scope of content subject to government takedown
requests for violating local law is considerably different in the United States as
compared to, for example, many European countries. Nonetheless, the
democratically determined scope of free expression in each country is a matter
established through the interaction of users and governments, and why then
should a U.S. company challenge those determinations on the basis of broader
U.S. understandings of free expression? The companies generally don’t.
Companies will “fold”—complying with, rather than challenging, government
requests—when they perceive governments and users to be aligned.
The examples already discussed are the comparatively easy ones. Various
complications make it more diﬃcult for companies to assess where the
interests of users lie and therefore how to apply the Digital Switzerlands idea.
One complication arises when the government involved is not democratic.
Then the assumption that local law represents an alliance between users and
the government—as opposed to oppression of users by the government—is
less tenable or perhaps entirely untenable. This may manifest in government
requests to take down content critical of the government, or, in a recent
requests for data resulted in production of some data); see also Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71
VAND. L. REV. 179, 236-37 (2018) (noting that U.S. tech companies “produce data in response to
approximately ﬁfty to seventy-ﬁve percent of ” government requests for information).
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example, Chinese government demands to remove Virtual Private Network
(VPN) apps that allow for secure, uncensored communications.211 Critics
allege that in those circumstances, the companies are not allied with users,
but rather are complicit in government repression of users, as illustrated in
Figure 4.212 Companies in this circumstance may confront a choice between
exiting a country or facing charges of complicity.
Figure 4: The Alliance to Be Avoided

Another related complication is that companies claiming to act for the benefit
of users may misunderstand, misrepresent, or project their own misperception of
users’ interests. “Users” are not monolithic and frequently have divergent
interests. And companies do not ascertain user interests through processes of
democratic governance.213 The China VPN example illustrates this difficulty. In
defending their decision to bow to this and other government demands,
companies have argued that it is better for users if the companies stay in the
market, rather than pulling out altogether.214 In other words, the companies argue
211 See, e.g., Emily Rauhala, Apple, Amazon Help China Curb the Use of Anti-Censorship Tools, WASH.
POST (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/holes-close-in-chinas-greatfirewall-as-apple-amazon-snub-apps-to-bypass-censors/2017/08/02/77750f38-7766-11e7-803f-a6c989606ac7_
story.html [https://perma.cc/6Q26-X3HA] (reporting steps by Apple and Amazon to prevent consumer
access to VPN apps at the request of the Chinese government).
212 See, e.g., Amul Kalia & Eva Galperin, Deciphering China’s VPN Ban, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/08/deciphering-chinas-vpn-ban [https://perma.cc/
R7Y8-ZRUR] (arguing that by removing the VPN apps from its app store, Apple “has once again
aided the Chinese government in its censorship campaign against its own citizens”).
213 See infra Section III.B.
214 See Rauhala, supra note 211 (quoting Apple CEO Tim Cook explaining that pulling the
VPN apps was preferable to Apple exiting the Chinese market because “participating in markets
and bringing beneﬁts to customers is in the best interest of the folks there and in other countries,
as well”). If Google reenters China with a censored search app, it may justify the decision with
similar arguments. See Farhad Manjoo, Google Tried to Change China. China May End Up Changing
Google., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/technology/google-
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that folding in the face of government demands for content censorship in
nondemocratic states is more like Figure 2 than Figure 4, because it allows them
to serve users by remaining in the censoring country and increasing users’ access
to information, at least to some extent.215 This defense is highly debatable. It
could simultaneously be criticized as a convenient rationalization and defended
as a reasonable judgment in the face of a difficult tradeoff.
Another complication for the companies attempting to protect users
against governments arises when local law has extraterritorial eﬀects.
Although the companies generally seem to understand users and
governments to be allied when democratically enacted laws are applied,
extraterritorial eﬀects of local law cause a problem because they pit the
interests of subsets of the companies’ users against one another. One example
of this phenomenon involves the “right to be forgotten” in European law. U.S.
technology companies have established routine processes to implement
requests for delisting of search results pursuant to the right to be forgotten.216
But Google is currently litigating a challenge to an order from the French
data protection authority that requires Google to delist search results across
all Google domains (including google.com) regardless of where in the world
the user attempting to search for the link is located.217 The expansive French
order pits the rights of Google users in Europe to exercise their right to be
forgotten against the rights of Google users elsewhere to freely access
information. In the face of competing user interests, Google has chosen to

china-conventionality.html (reporting that Google CEO Sundar Pichai made such arguments in a
meeting with employees); McKune & Deibert, supra note 33 (discussing the rationales for and
circumstances of Google’s possible reentry). But see supra note 33 (noting that Google appears to
have halted the project for now).
215 Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 138 (noting that “China’s liberal bloggers . . . tended to
support the decision by Microsoft and Google to provide service to Chinese users,” despite the fact
that the services were censored); id. at 174 (“Blocking US Internet and telecommunications
companies from ever operating in authoritarian or quasi-democratic countries amounts to
counterproductive overkill, preventing citizens from using some of the world’s most innovative and
open technology to advocate for change . . . .”).
216 See, e.g., EU Privacy Removal, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/
legal-removal-request?complaint_type=rtbf [https://perma.cc/FWX4-ZMY7]; Request to Block Bing
Search Results in Europe, BING, https://www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request [https://perma.cc/
D79K-TZA5].
217 See Kent Walker, A Principle That Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (May
19, 2016), https://www.blog.google/topics/google-europe/a-principle-that-should-not-be-forgotten
[https://perma.cc/3YDA-92P5] (discussing the French order and Google’s response). This would be
an expansion of Google’s current practice, which involves delisting search results from “all European
versions of Google Search,” as well as “us[ing] geolocation signals (like IP addresses) to restrict
access to the delisted URL on all Google Search domains, including google.com, when accessed
from the country of the person requesting the removal.” Peter Fleischer, Adapting Our Approach to the
European Right to Be Forgotten, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.blog.google/
topics/google-europe/adapting-our-approach-to-european-rig [https://perma.cc/BH8T-WCE6].
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ﬁght the French order, and the challenge is pending before the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).218
As all of these examples indicate, technology companies face diﬃcult
dilemmas with respect to government requests or demands that the
companies impose content controls.219 When the content controls result from
local law in democratic countries, the triangular framing explains why
companies often do not challenge the orders. The model also suggests,
however, circumstances when the companies might ﬁght government orders,
especially when purportedly local law infringes on the rights of users outside
the ordering country. Companies have also dealt with concerns about
government-requested content controls by establishing a practice of releasing
extensive transparency reports that detail requests for content removal,
including the government agency, court order, or other removal requester and
the nature of information removed.220
Yet another complication has recently emerged. To determine whether to
fight or to cooperate with governments, companies must first perceive that
government action is occurring. That task can sometimes be complicated, as
shown by the multitude of revelations about Russian use of social media to
influence the 2016 U.S. election.221 U.S. tech companies were caught flat footed.
Before and during the election cycle, they suffered from similar failures of
imagination to those that plagued U.S. government actors and commentators.
And even as Russian actors made significant use of platforms like Facebook and
Twitter, the companies failed to appreciate what was happening, much less to
218 See, e.g., Alex Hern, ECJ to Rule on Whether “Right to Be Forgotten” Can Stretch Beyond EU,
GUARDIAN (UK) (July 20, 2017, 5:19 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/
ecj-ruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed [https://perma.cc/JY3A-VME3]
(noting that the case asks the ECJ to clarify the scope of its 2014 ruling on the right to be forgotten).
219 In addition to the risk of the companies being coopted by governments, there is also a risk
of the reverse occurring: companies coopting governments in ways that harm users. For example,
Facebook’s Free Basics service, which provides limited Internet access to sites curated by Facebook for
free in less developed countries, has been criticized as “digital colonialism.” Olivia Solon, ‘It’s Digital
Colonialism’: How Facebook’s Free Internet Service Has Failed Its Users, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2017, 8:00
EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets
[https://perma.cc/ST3K-XD9V] (quoting Ellery Biddle, Global Voices). For an in-depth discussion
of the backlash and ultimate government regulation that blocked Free Basics in India, see Rahul Bhatia, The
Inside Story of Facebook’s Biggest Setback, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016, 1:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/may/12/facebook-free-basics-india-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/7J2J-27F6].
220 See, e.g., Facebook Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.facebook.com
[https://perma.cc/S7PB-UE8U] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); Government Requests to Remove Content, supra
note 209; Removal Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests.html
[https://perma.cc/7E2N-ZYST] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); Search Removals Under European Privacy Law,
GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview [https://perma.cc/5EF2-SWYT?
type=image] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
221 See Streitfeld, supra note 2 (noting with respect to Russian election interference that “[t]he
manipulation was so eﬃcient and so lacking in transparency that the companies themselves barely
noticed it was happening”).
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react effectively.222 As Facebook eventually admitted, “In the run-up to the 2016
elections, we were focused on the kinds of cybersecurity attacks typically used
by nation states, for example phishing and malware attacks. And we were too
slow to spot this type of information operations interference.”223
This lack of understanding is a practical complication more than a
theoretical one. With the beneﬁt of current information, the application of
the triangle framing suggests a path forward for the companies. The actions
of the Russian government in attempting to spread misinformation and
exacerbate social tensions are clearly at odds with the interests of U.S. users
in legitimate debate and a fair electoral process. Thus, per the Digital
Switzerlands model, the companies should act to protect U.S. users from the
Russian government’s actions and from similar governmental actions going
forward. With varying degrees of reluctance, the companies have begun to do

222 See Adam Entous, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Obama Tried to Give Zuckerberg a
Wake-Up Call over Fake News on Facebook, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/obama-tried-to-give-zuckerberg-a-wake-up-call-over-fake-news-on-facebook/2017/09/
24/15d19b12-ddac-4ad5-ac6e-ef909e1c1284_story.html [https://perma.cc/CQE7-HK4Y] (reporting that
in November 2016, President Obama “made a personal appeal to Zuckerberg to take the threat of fake news
and political disinformation seriously,” and that “[l]ike the U.S. government, Facebook didn’t foresee the
wave of disinformation that was coming and the political pressure that followed”). Company representatives
have admitted as much in recent congressional testimony. See Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 18 (2017) [hereinafter Election Hearings]
(statement of Sean J. Edgett, Acting Gen. Counsel, Twitter, Inc.) (“Twitter is familiar with problems of
spam and automation, including how they can be used to amplify messages. The abuse of those methods by
sophisticated foreign actors to attempt state-sponsored manipulation of elections is a new challenge for
us—and one that we are determined to meet.”); id. at 12 (statement of Colin Stretch, Gen. Counsel,
Facebook) (“After the 2016 election, we learned from press accounts and statements by congressional leaders
that Russian actors might have tried to interfere in the election by exploiting Facebook’s ad tools. This is not
something we had seen before, and so we started an investigation that continues to this day.”).
223 Russian Ads Released by Congress, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (May 10, 2018), https://newsroom.
fb.com/news/2018/05/russian-ads-released-by-congress/?wpisrc=nl_cybersecurity202&wpmm=1
[https://perma.cc/GW43-33MM].
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so, under sustained pressure from the U.S. Congress,224 and the eﬃcacy of
their eﬀorts remains open to debate.225
For all these reasons, the Digital Switzerland idea is limited in scope. It
is not a promise by the companies to ﬁght governments in all circumstances
or every instance where human rights advocates would wish. Rather, from the
companies’ perspective(s), the Digital Switzerland framing suggests they
should resist governments where they can raise plausible legal arguments and
credibly claim to be allied with users when the interests of users and
government diverge. This account explains why the companies have
challenged government actions that threaten technical security and why they
have sought transparency related to government access to user account
content. Circumstances where the interests of users are set against one
another and where, for various reasons, there is a serious question about
whether compliance with local law serves user interests raise diﬃcult
questions for the companies, which sometimes ﬁght and sometimes fold. The
Digital Switzerlands model is idealized both in its simpliﬁcation of the
cyberspace ecosystem and in its description of the companies’ behavior. The
companies’ actual instantiation of the Digital Switzerlands concept remains
ﬂawed, as the Russian election interference response shows. But ﬂaws in
implementation may be remedied over time, and even now, they do not
224 Executives have given overviews of their companies’ responses in testimony to Congress. See
Election Hearings, supra note 222, at 22-33 (statement of Sean J. Edgett, Acting Gen. Counsel, Twitter,
Inc.) (discussing Twitter’s response); id. at 11-15 (statement of Colin Stretch, Gen. Counsel, Facebook)
(discussing Facebook’s response); id. at 43-44 (statement of Kent Walker, Senior Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Google) (discussing Google’s response); see also Russian Ads Released by Congress, supra note 223
(detailing measures about, for example, ad transparency and disabling accounts run by Russia’s Internet
Research Agency). Of course, the risk of foreign government interference is not limited to the United
States. The companies’ duty to protect users from such interference extends to all countries where their
users are at risk of manipulation, and they have begun to take actions to address manipulation concerns
worldwide. See, e.g., Nathaniel Gleicher, Taking Down More Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior: What
We’ve Found So Far, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Aug. 21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/
more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior [https://perma.cc/969B-ZCMH] (reporting on Facebook’s
removal of accounts linked to Russian military intelligence and Iranian state media “for coordinated
inauthentic behavior” targeted at people in “the Middle East, Latin America, UK and US”).
225 Legislators are considering taking the companies’ response out of the realm of voluntary
action and regulating at least some actions, particularly foreign-linked ad purchases. See Cecelia
Kang, Nicholas Fandos & Mike Isaac, Tech Executives Are Contrite About Election Meddling, but Make
Few Promises on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/
us/politics/facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html (reporting support among Democratic and
Republican Senators for regulating political ad funding). The Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017),
would impose disclosure requirements for political ad purchases on online platforms. With Senator John
McCain’s death, the bill lost its sole Republican cosponsor. Nonetheless, because this bill involves the U.S.
government protecting U.S. users from foreign government meddling, the Digital Switzerlands framing
suggests that the companies should not oppose it, and indeed some companies have announced their
support. See infra notes 296–301 and accompanying text (discussing the Honest Ads Act and noting that
some companies, including Microsoft and Facebook, have announced support for the bill).
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decrease the importance of the normatively laden questions that the
companies’ Digital Switzerlands self-conception raises.
The remaining Part of this Article takes up these issues.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF DIGITAL SWITZERLANDS
The existence and continued growth of U.S. technology companies will have
a number of implications. This Part identifies some of the most salient impacts
and provides tentative thoughts on the extent to which the rise of technology
companies as Digital Switzerlands is beneficial or detrimental.
A. Individuals’ Power and Freedom
Consider ﬁrst the overall power of individuals. On the one hand, the
companies represent a new and additional layer of power over individuals. In
very real ways, they regulate users—how users access information, whether
communications are secure, the extent to which users’ privacy is protected,
etc. As Larry Lessig has explained, “[t]he software and hardware that make
cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave,”
and while “[t]he substance of these constraints may vary, . . . they are
experienced as conditions on your access to cyberspace.”226 Code, including
code written by technology companies, constitutes regulation.227 It “embeds
certain values or makes certain values impossible.”228 Technology companies
have been regulators for as long as they have written code. But the relative
importance of their role as regulators has accelerated with the ever-increasing
dependence of users on the hardware and software that they create and sell.
While technology companies are an added layer of regulation and
regulators over individuals, their rise also represents a relative decline in
governmental power over users. As discussed above, the companies have
become, in certain circumstances, powerful forces standing between
governments and individuals or with individuals against governments.229
Companies have defended users against claims to government data access in
several recent cases,230 and they have ﬁled lawsuits against the government to
226 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 124 (2d ed. 2006); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (1998)
(arguing that “the set of rules for information ﬂows imposed by technology and communication
networks form a ‘Lex Informatica’” that regulates users).
227 LESSIG, supra note 226, at 125. For an overview of the literature addressing regulation by
code and its challenges, see Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 138, at 711-22.
228 LESSIG, supra note 226, at 125.
229 Cf. supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges posed by
nondemocratic states).
230 See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text; see also Dan Levine & Joe Menn, Exclusive:
U.S. Government Seeks Facebook Help to Wiretap Messenger - Sources, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2018, 4:34 PM),
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empower individuals by providing them with more information about
government demands for information.231
Sometimes, the technology companies are the only parties in a position
realistically to challenge government demands. The companies are on notice
about government demands in a way that individual users often are not.232 The
companies are the recipients of the government requests for information or
modification of technology, whereas individual users often have no idea their
information has been the subject of a request, sometimes precisely because of
gag orders imposed on the companies. Moreover, as the recipients of
government demands and court orders, the companies clearly have standing to
challenge government actions.233 Standing has been a persistent problem for
potential suits by users. In some cases, users have difficulty satisfying standing
requirements because they cannot show that they personally have been targeted
or will have their security compromised in the future, and therefore cannot meet
the requirements for an injury in fact.234 In other cases, courts have not deemed
government intrusions on individual privacy interests legally cognizable.235
Even if technology companies are not the only possible challengers, their other
advantages make them effective challengers. They are extremely well resourced and
capable of hiring top-notch legal counsel to bring and defend cases.236 They are also
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-encryption-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-government-seeksfacebook-help-to-wiretap-messenger-sources-idUSKBN1L226D [https://perma.cc/X82L-ASNP] (reporting
that Facebook is resisting in court a government demand to write code to allow law enforcement to
eavesdrop on a suspect’s voice conversations in Facebook Messenger); Ellen Nakashima, Facebook
Wins Court Battle over Law Enforcement Access to Encrypted Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/facebook-wins-court-battle-over-lawenforcement-access-to-encrypted-phone-calls/2018/09/28/df438a6a-c33a-11e8-b338-a3289f6cb742_
story.html [https://perma.cc/XL37-5JAJ] (reporting that a federal judge “ruled that the government
cannot force Facebook to break the encryption on its popular Messenger voice app”).
231 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
232 See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 157 (2018) (noting
that “surveillance intermediaries” can overcome the standing problems that hinder individual
plaintiffs because they “know whenever a program is used” and thereby also have “the flexibility to
choose the best litigating posture”).
233 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—More Data, More Problems, supra note 60, at 1739 (highlighting
the doctrinal and practical advantages the tech companies have over individuals seeking to challenge
government surveillance). But see Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment: Searches
of Personal Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 444-47 (2017) (discussing cases in which judges
took a restrictive view of company standing for Fourth Amendment claims).
234 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (discussing requirements for
Article III standing).
235 This may be changing. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (limiting
the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine).
236 See, e.g., Taylor Goldenstein, High-Profile Attorney Ted Olson Joins Apple’s Fight Against
FBI Terror Probe, L.A. T IMES (Feb. 18, 2016, 12:03 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-ted-olson-joins-apple-fight-against-fbi-20160218-story.html [https://perma.cc/F54H-W7V4]
(discussing Apple’s representation by former Solicitor General Ted Olson); see also Rozenshtein, supra
note 232, at 157 (noting that companies “have the resources to litigate frequently and to the bitter end”).
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sophisticated organizations that have personnel dedicated to public relations, and
they have embraced the public sphere, not just the courts, as a battleground in
pushing back against government requests.237 The companies’ sophistication has
also manifested in their ability and willingness to coordinate support for
whichever company takes the lead on a particular issue. They have joined suits
brought by other companies, filed joint amicus briefs, and issued supportive public
statements.238 Market-based interests, stemming from the companies’ global reach,
can incentivize them to deploy their considerable resources in support of
security-based concerns affecting users, as discussed above.239
While not dismissing the potentially negative impact on individuals from
having an added layer of regulation, for now, the actions of technology
companies as Digital Switzerlands often appear to have a positive eﬀect on
the power of individual users vis-à-vis governments. The companies have
proven to be eﬀective challengers to the exercise of certain types of
government power over individuals, namely government claims related to
access to and the security of user account content.
The idea that the existence of two regulators can sometimes produce gains
for individual freedom is not a new one. In The Federalist No. 51, James
Madison addressed the U.S. federal system and argued that because of the
dual federal and state sovereigns, “a double security arises to the rights of the
people.”240 The Supreme Court has echoed this idea, with Justice Kennedy
explaining in a recent majority opinion: “The federal system rests on what
might at ﬁrst seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is enhanced by
the creation of two governments, not one.’”241 The reason that two
governments are understood to be paradoxically more protective is because,
237 For an example, see Apple CEO Tim Cook’s statement to Apple customers regarding Apple’s
decision to fight the court order in the San Bernardino case. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers,
APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/S4UF-B8J4].
238 For discussion and a visual representation of the support networks among the tech
companies, see Dina Bass & David Ingold, The Top Five Tech Rivals Join Forces to Shape Policy—And
Fight the Government, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2017, 4:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2017-06-27/the-top-five-tech-rivals-join-forces-to-shape-policy-and-fight-the-government.
See, e.g., Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2-7, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-0002 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2018), 2018 WL 557075, at *2-6 (showing amicus
support for Microsoft from technology companies, including Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google).
239 See supra Section II.A. The stability of these incentives is a separate question taken up later
in this Part. See infra Section III.D.
240 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
241 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220-21 (2011) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
758 (1999)); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty
is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diﬀusion of sovereign power.’” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (“In the tension between federal and
state power lies the promise of liberty.”).
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as Madison argued, “[t]he diﬀerent governments will control each other,”
checking their respective powers for the beneﬁt of the people.242 Madison’s
basic insight remains applicable in the company-versus-government context:
having two powerful regulators, rather than only one, can sometimes
strengthen individuals’ freedom, liberty, and security because often it takes a
powerful regulator to challenge and check another powerful regulator.
However, the quasi-sovereign status of U.S. technology companies does
not make for a perfect analogy to U.S. states or to the U.S. federal system
because one of the regulators is not democratic. The companies’ democracy
deﬁcit raises concerns addressed in the next Section.
B. Democracy and Accountability
Another signiﬁcant concern with technology companies taking on a role
akin to sovereigns is that they are undemocratic. The legitimacy of
governments is often judged by the extent to which they are “democratic.”
While the meaning and essential characteristics of a democracy are
contested,243 a common feature is voting and elections as a means of ensuring
government responsiveness to and representativeness of citizens.244
With elections as a metric of democracy, the technology companies do not fare
well. At least for users who are not also shareholders, the companies don’t hold
votes. Users don’t elect company leaders or vote on policy changes. Changes to
Facebook’s privacy policy, for example, are imposed, not voted into effect.245 Users
are given notice, but not a choice.246 Similarly, when Apple chose to resist the U.S.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 240, at 323.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 2 (1989) (arguing that
“democracy . . . nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague
endorsement of a popular idea”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 43, 71 (1989) (“Political science theorists disagree greatly about what ‘democracy’ means, and
no one theory can claim axiomatic status.”).
244 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 10-11 (1982) (defining
democracy based on seven characteristics, including elections); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2007) (“When stripped down to their essentials, all definitions of democracy
rest ultimately on the primacy of electoral choice and the presumptive claim of the majority to rule.”).
245 Facebook did experiment with a version of direct democracy in 2009. See Facebook Opens
Governance of Service and Policy Process to Users, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Feb. 26, 2009),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2009/02/facebook-opens-governance-of-service-and-policy-process-to-users
[https://perma.cc/35LA-3AKQ] (announcing mechanisms for voting on several policies). The
experiment was short-lived. See Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Wants to Democratize Facebook—Here’s
What Happened When He Tried, VERGE (Apr. 5, 2018, 1:40 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/4/5/17176834/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-democracy-governance-vote-failure [https://perma.cc/
TDH4-WBBM] (discussing low voting rates and Facebook’s abandonment of the voting process).
246 This is not to imply that users have no “voice” options, but simply that elections—the
quintessential voice option in democratic governments—are not available. See ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
242
243
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government’s requests for assistance in accessing the San Bernardino shooter’s
iPhone, it did not hold a vote among Apple users.
The lack of enfranchisement among the companies’ users as to companies’
policy choices masks, however, a type of enfranchisement that the companies’
users do possess. Corporate “citizenship” is voluntary. Individuals choose to
become part of a company’s user base and to associate themselves with the
company, for whatever protection it may or may not provide. Unlike national
citizenship, corporate allegiance isn’t assigned by birth.
Not only do users have a choice in associating themselves with particular
companies, they also have a choice in disassociating. In other words, users can
vote with their feet, dollars, and service choices, exercising exit rights.247 The
exit rights accompanying corporate “citizenship” are fairly easy—though not
totally painless—to exercise.248 Users can exchange one corporate allegiance
for another or acquire multiple corporate allegiances much more easily than
they can with respect to citizenships in territorial states.249
Lessig describes the distinction as one between “citizen-sovereignties” and
“merchant-sovereignties,” where “citizen-sovereignties” address the relationship
between individuals and governments.250 In citizen-sovereignties, the individual’s
“role . . . is that of a stakeholder with a voice” and “a right—if the government is to
be called democratic—to participate in its structuring.”251 Merchant-sovereignties,
by contrast, describe commercial relations, where individuals’ “recourse . . . is
simply to take [their] business elsewhere,” that is, “to exit.”252
Exit isn’t just easier than voice for individuals with respect to
merchant-sovereignties. Exit from allegiance to a particular company is also
easier than exit from allegiance to a state.253 In an eﬀort to prevent individuals
from being rendered stateless, international law places some limits on states’
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970) (deﬁning “voice” as “any attempt at all to change, rather
than to escape from, an objectionable state of aﬀairs”).
247 See, e.g., id. at 15 (explaining that “exit” is fundamentally an economic concept whereby
“[t]he customer who, dissatisﬁed with the product of one ﬁrm, shifts to that of another, uses the
market to defend his welfare or to improve his position”).
248 See LESSIG, supra note 226, at 288 (arguing that switching sovereigns in “real space” is
“costly,” but “in cyberspace, moving is not so hard,” as evidenced by the ease with which people can
switch video games). But see id. at 290 (“Paradoxically . . . it may be harder to change communities
in cyberspace than it is in real space . . . because you must give up everything in a move from one
cyber-community to another, whereas in real space you can bring much of it with you.”); Cohen,
supra note 18, at 144 (arguing that platforms “operate with the goal of making clusters of transactions
and relationships stickier—sticky enough to adhere to the platform despite participants’ theoretical
ability to exit and look elsewhere for other intermediation options”).
249 But see infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text.
250 LESSIG, supra note 226, at 287.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 246, at 33 (noting that “the exit option” is nearly unavailable
“in such basic social organizations as . . . the state”).
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ability to denationalize citizens.254 Companies are under no such restrictions.
Any requirements that a company continue its association with particular
users are purely contractual, and individuals can be cut oﬀ from any and all
corporate “sovereigns” if they violate, for example, the terms of service.255
Although cessation of the relationship between “merchant-sovereigns” and
their users is comparatively easier—from either side—than in citizen-sovereignties,
while the relationship exists, the scope of merchant-sovereignties is thinner but
broader than in traditional sovereignties. The technology companies govern a
smaller—though usually very important—fraction of their users’ lives than
territorial sovereigns, but their user bases are far broader, stretching well beyond
the domain of a single territorial sovereign. Although the companies are only thinly
accountable to their users, to the extent that they are accountable at all, it is to global,
not just national, constituencies. Consider U.S. government surveillance programs.
The U.S. government’s position is that users abroad who are not U.S. persons have
no legal right to protection from U.S. government surveillance.256 Non-U.S.
persons outside the United States are outside the constituency to whom the U.S.
government owes legal duties in this context.257 The technology companies, by
contrast, do not and could not get away with (at least without provoking exercise
of exit rights) making a similar distinction. They serve worldwide constituencies,
and as explained above, their non-U.S. users outnumber their U.S. users.258

254 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 15 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 211 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (noting
that international law “has accepted some limitations on involuntary termination of nationality . . . to
prevent statelessness” and protect against denationalization’s use as “an instrument of racial, religious,
ethnic, or gender discrimination, or of political repression”).
255 See, e.g., Katie Benner, Twitter Suspends 235,000 More Accounts over Extremism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/technology/twitter-suspends-accounts-extremism.html
(reporting that from mid-2015 through mid-August 2016, Twitter suspended 360,000 accounts for
terrorist or extremist content); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311
[https://perma.cc/9JE9-STB7] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“You may not make specific threats of violence
or wish for the serious physical harm, death, or disease of an individual or group of people. This includes,
but is not limited to, threatening or promoting terrorism.”).
256 See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on Review of Signals
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence [https://perma.cc/WH6U-B3GE]) (“[T]he
legal safeguards that restrict surveillance against U.S. persons without a warrant do not apply to
foreign persons overseas.”).
257 The Obama Administration nonetheless imposed policy limits on surveillance of non-U.S.
persons abroad. See Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1
(Jan. 17, 2014) (detailing limitations and recognizing that U.S. “signals intelligence activities must
take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their
nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in
the handling of their personal information”).
258 See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
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In light of the role that technology companies are currently playing,
however, understanding them simply as “merchant-sovereignties” is becoming
increasingly unsatisfying. Lessig argued over a decade ago that “cyberspace is
not yet dominated (or even broadly populated) by citizen-sovereignties. The
sovereignties we see so far are all merchant-sovereignties. And this is even
more clearly true with the Internet. . . . Our relationship to them is the same
as our relationship to McDonald’s.”259 Analogizing Google, Microsoft,
Facebook, and the other technology companies—especially considered
together—to McDonald’s no longer seems accurate. It’s a gross
understatement of the role the companies play. Users’ relationships to these
companies are not now, if they ever were, purely transactional.
Moreover, even though users have exit rights as to any particular company,
it has become extraordinarily diﬃcult to shed all corporate citizenship—that
is, to opt out of allegiance to all of the major technology companies.260 One
may not need any particular social media company, but avoiding them all
would require cutting oneself oﬀ from a signiﬁcant sphere of social
interaction. Similarly, one may avoid Apple, but foregoing both iOS and
Android would likely mean returning to a ﬂip phone.261 Exit rights involve a
choice of companies, but not exit from the technology companies—at least
not without signiﬁcant inconvenience and loss of connectivity.
The evolution of the technology companies into Digital Switzerlands may
suggest that they have reached an inflection point between merchant-sovereignties
and citizen-sovereignties, or more likely that they are coming to embody a middle
category, with characteristics of both. The companies do not offer the voting rights
characteristic of democratic states, but they are subject to users’ exit rights and
have broader constituencies than territorial sovereigns. They promise less to their
“citizens” but also in certain circumstances defend them against the territorial
governments that both promise and demand more.
If it is correct that the companies are acquiring at least some
characteristics of citizen-sovereignties, then it is worth asking how they can
be pushed toward the other values expected and demanded of such entities.
The next Section turns to those public-law values concerns.

LESSIG, supra note 226, at 287.
See SCHNEIER, supra note 44, at 58 (2015) (analogizing technology companies to “feudal
lords” and arguing that “[w]e might prefer one feudal lord to the others[,] . . . distribute our
allegiance among several of these companies, or studiously avoid a particular one we don’t like,” but
“it’s becoming increasingly diﬃcult to not pledge allegiance to at least one of them”).
261 See James Vincent, 99.6 Percent of New Smartphones Run Android or iOS, VERGE (Feb. 16, 2017,
6:11 AM EST), https://www.theverge.com/2017/2/16/14634656/android-ios-market-share-blackberry-2016
[https://perma.cc/HK4J-AUGQ].
259
260
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C. Public-Law Values
To the extent that technology companies are acting in ways that suggest
equivalence with states, should they be held responsible for the public-law values
demanded of (at least democratic) governments?262 Public-law values include
accountability, transparency, fairness or due process, and protection of privacy
and security.263 Scholars have long advocated extending the public-law values
that democratic governments serve to at least some private actors.264 In
particular, significant concerns about the extent to which contracting out
government functions to private actors undermines public-law values have led
some scholars to argue for making private contractors abide by requirements of,

262 Cf. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35, at 14-19 (Apr. 6, 2018) (arguing that tech
companies should be guided by human rights law in their approach to content moderation); Eyal
Benvenisti, Foreword: Upholding Democracy amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role for the
Law of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 71-75 (2018) (arguing that tech companies exercise
important governance functions and expressing concerns about the eﬃcacy of either self- or
governmental regulation to ensure global administrative law values); Jon D. Michaels, Running
Government Like a Business . . . Then and Now, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1152, 1180-81 (2015) (reviewing
NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013) (positing that because dominant businesses in some
sectors, including technology companies, “essentially control resources, networks, and services that
are of vital importance to large segments of the American public,” which “interacts with those firms
almost out of necessity (rather than choice)[,] . . . there might well be reason to insist that they accept
corresponding public responsibilities”); K. Sabeel Rahman, Artificial Sovereigns: A Quasi-Constitutional
Moment for Tech?, L AW & P OLITICAL E CON . (June 15, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/06/15/
a-quasi-constitutional-moment-for-tech [https://perma.cc/YTR8-XLCU] (“Regulating and responding
to new technologies and modern forms of economic and political power . . . represent a variation on
familiar questions of public law and constitutional design: how to structure the exercise of potentially
arbitrary, state-like power, rendering it contestable, and therefore legitimate.”).
263 See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: The Promise of
Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 417, 419 (2013) (identifying “core public values” as
including “the procedural values of global administrative law: public participation, transparency, and
accountability”); Eichensehr, supra note 74, at 516-21 (arguing for including privacy and security
among public-law values in the cybersecurity context); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003) (listing the “democratic norms of
accountability, due process, equality, and rationality”); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard
B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 17 (deﬁning global administrative law in terms of mechanisms to
ensure “global administrative bodies . . . meet adequate standards of transparency, participation,
reasoned decision, and legality,” as well as “eﬀective review”).
264 For example, global administrative law, which focuses on concerns about institutional
compliance with what I here call public-law values, casts a broad net in defining relevant bodies to include
not just “formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies,” but also “hybrid public-private regulatory bodies,
and some private regulatory bodies exercising transnational governance functions of particular public
significance.” Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 263, at 17; see id. at 22 (providing the International
Standardization Organization as an example of a private regulatory body); see, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note
263, at 71-75 (discussing tech companies in the context of global administrative law).
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for example, transparency and accountability that would otherwise apply only
to governments.265 Others have extended the argument for applying public law
obligations beyond formal contractors to private actors involved in informal
partnerships with governments.266 In a recent article, I argued for extending
public values concerns and responsibilities still further to encompass companies
in the cybersecurity sphere when they fulfill quintessential public functions, like
transnational crime control, foreign policy, and national defense.267
All of these prior arguments for the application of public-law values to
private parties rest on the nature of the functions that the private parties are
performing: public-law values apply where the private actors are performing
public functions, defined either by direct outsourcing from governments or by
the inherent nature of the functions. It is not clear that the companies’ actions
as “Digital Switzerlands”—actions like challenging government efforts to
access users’ information and seeking to disclose information about government
information requests—are public functions. Thus, the function-based or
conduct-based theories previously used to justify applying public-law values to
private parties may not have the same purchase.
If public-law values are to be applied to companies playing the role of
Digital Switzerlands, a new theory may be necessary. One possible justification
could come in a shift from a function-based understanding of when public-law
values should attach to a status-based understanding.268 This theory would
265 See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L.
383, 403-04 (2006) (proposing extending public-law values to private parties via government contract
requirements); Freeman, supra note 263, at 1315 (proposing that Congress by legislation could require
private parties to comply with public-law values); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1266-69 (2003) (detailing four models
through which private parties performing public functions can be held accountable); Paul R. Verkuil,
Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 468 (2006)
(“When private contractors perform inherent government functions, they jeopardize core values of
public law and weaken government’s capacity to do the common good.”).
266 See Michaels, supra note 43, at 947-48, 952-53 (discussing ways in which corporations engaged
in informal intelligence partnerships with the government can be harnessed to increase accountability).
267 See Eichensehr, supra note 74, at 475-78.
268 International law scholars may find it helpful to analogize to the difference between types of
official immunity: the functional immunity ratione materiae covers a government official’s official conduct
while in office, while the status-based immunity ratione personae covers all actions of a high-ranking
government official while that person is in office. See, e.g., LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D.
MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 880 (6th ed. 2014) (discussing the
different types of immunity and noting that after high-ranking officials leave office, their immunity
drops from immunity ratione personae to immunity ratione materiae). The Supreme Court has deployed
a similar status-based approach to determining the applicability of constitutional rights. In Marsh v.
Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments barred enforcement of
a ban on distribution of religious leaflets in a privately owned company town. 326 U.S. 501, 507-09
(1946). The ability of the town’s residents to engage in free communication, the Court explained, was
sufficiently important that constitutional rights attached, despite the fact that town was run by a
private, rather than a public, entity. Id. at 508-09.
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focus not on assessing whether the companies’ actions are public functions, but
rather on extending basic public-law values requirements to private entities that
attain a certain kind of relationship to individuals and governments, namely
significant power over individuals and comparable power to governments.269
Put another way, if and when certain private parties attain government-like
status, then they should also acquire government-like responsibilities.
What would it mean in practice for the companies to implement public-law
values? Several existing examples provide some models for how the companies
could do so, and how practices could be generalized. One example is
transparency reports.270 Google pioneered the transparency report in 2010,271
followed by Twitter in 2012.272 The practice has since expanded to technology
companies around the world,273 and the reports routinely include information
on, for example, government requests for user account information and
National Security Letters, as well as the companies’ response to such requests,
where permitted.274 The transparency reports, as the name suggests, serve the
public-law value of transparency. Transparency applies to governments
269 One way to understand this trigger would be to deploy a “bundle of sticks” conception of
sovereignty, somewhat akin to property law’s familiar conception of property as a “bundle of sticks.”
See, e.g., Anthony Sammons, The “Under-Theorization” of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for
Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 114 (2003)
(“[T]he analogy of property as a ‘bundle of sticks’ provides a useful framework for appreciating the
present balance between state sovereignty and the international legal order.”); Celia R. Taylor, A
Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 745, 754 (1997)
(proposing a “functionalist conceptualization of sovereignty” modeled on property law’s “‘bundle of
sticks’ that are divisible and transferable”). The question then becomes at what point does a private
actor possess a sufficient number of—or sufficiently important—”sovereignty sticks” for obligations
based on public-law values to attach to that actor. Thanks to Sean Murphy for suggesting this framing.
270 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
271 See David Drummond, Tools to Visualize Access to Information, GOOGLE: PUB. POLICY BLOG
(Sept. 21, 2010), https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2010/09/tools-to-visualize-access-to.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4A7-PG5P] (describing the ﬁrst transparency report, which focused on
government requests to remove content and government-caused outages in Google services).
272 See Jeremy Kessel, Twitter Transparency Report, TWITTER: BLOG (July 2, 2012),
https://blog.twitter.com/oﬃcial/en_us/a/2012/twitter-transparency-report.html [https://perma.cc/
K8TA-BSE7] (announcing Twitter’s ﬁrst transparency report, which included information on
government requests for user information, government requests to “withhold content,” and
copyright takedown notices).
273 For a database of companies that release transparency reports, see Transparency Reporting
Index, ACCESS NOW, https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-reporting-index [https://perma.cc/
8KLY-4AVK] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). See also GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP.,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/S3GC-9TBZ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019)
(providing a “non-exhaustive list of transparency reporting efforts”).
274 See, e.g., Report on Government and Private Party Requests for Customer Information: July 1 - December
31, 2016, APPLE (2016), https://images.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency/requests-2016-H2-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZCF9-CHSH]; U.S. National Security Orders Report, MICROSOFT,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/fisa [https://perma.cc/SK54-GSD9]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (providing data on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders and
National Security Letters).
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through, for example, freedom of information laws and requirements to publish
proposed regulations for comment.275 These legal requirements do not apply to
private actors,276 but nonetheless, the companies have taken it upon themselves
to promote a measure of transparency.277
Another example of companies attempting to serve public-law values is
the way they approach right-to-be-forgotten requests. The companies have
internal procedures to guide their determinations about whether to delist
content pursuant to a request from an individual.278 Google’s EU Privacy
Removal form explains that the company “will balance the privacy rights of
the individual concerned with the interest of the general public in having
access to the information, as well as the right of others to distribute the
information,” and the company “may decline to remove certain information”
in which there is a public interest, including “information about ﬁnancial
scams, professional malpractice, criminal convictions, or public conduct of
government oﬃcials.”279 Microsoft’s Bing delisting form similarly explains
that “Bing must balance individual privacy interests against the public
interest in protecting free expression and the free availability of information,
consistent with European law.”280 These regularized processes attempt to
provide a measure of due process to both takedown requesters and other users
who may have an interest in accessing the information. Similarly, the
companies also provide means for users to appeal takedowns of the content
they post.281 Although these measures have been criticized,282 the fact that
the companies are attempting to standardize processes, as opposed to treating

275 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (setting out procedures
for notice and comment rulemaking); Freedom of Information Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)
(setting out public information requirements and procedures).
276 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 241, 249-50 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (explaining that the Administrative Procedure Act and
Freedom of Information Act do not reach government contractors).
277 But see Cohen, supra note 18, at 175 (“[A]lthough the major platforms widely publicize
information about the takedown notices they receive from copyright owners and, to the extent
permitted, about government production requests, they provide no comparable public transparency
about the details of their own automatic ﬁltering and manipulation.”).
278 For a detailed overview of how the companies approach content moderation generally, see
Klonick, supra note 136, at 1631-48.
279 EU Privacy Removal, supra note 216.
280 Request to Block Bing Search Results in Europe, supra note 216.
281 See Klonick, supra note 136, at 1647-48 (detailing the companies’ appeal processes); How to
Appeal, ONLINECENSORSHIP, https://onlinecensorship.org/resources/how-to-appeal [https://perma.cc/
PQS5-JYBH] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (collecting information on how to appeal content takedowns
and blockages by sites including Facebook and Twitter).
282 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 262, at 10-14 (expressing concerns about, inter alia, vague rules on content
moderation, inadequate notification and appeal processes, and limited transparency about content removals).
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requests in an ad hoc fashion, suggests a move toward a measure of due
process—albeit one not legally required for nongovernmental actors.283
Numerous mechanisms could drive the companies to apply public-law values
to their actions. Market-based competition may be one factor. If competitor
companies undertake a certain practice, like publication of transparency reports,
and companies believe users value the practice, then competitive pressure will
drive additional companies to undertake the practice. Another mechanism is
diffusion of corporate social responsibility norms. To the extent that these norms
incorporate public-law values, then they can also push companies toward
adoption of practices that serve values like transparency and due process.284 For
example, Microsoft’s transparency reports are already located under the
corporate social responsibility heading on the company’s website,285 along with
issues like environmental sustainability and human rights.286
Another mechanism that might drive the companies to implement public-law
values is the perception that certain practices, like requiring governments to
produce legal process before the company turns over account information, have
become the industry standard. The companies’ interest in complying with
industry-standard practices may be partly competitive, as discussed above, but
it may also be a calculation about legal risk. Tort liability often depends on
whether a company has engaged in a commercially reasonable practice, and to
the extent that a company is out of step with practices that have become
industry standard, it may open itself to claims by individuals who suffer harm
from the company’s failure to align itself with the mainstream practices. This
mechanism still involves voluntary compliance by the companies with public-law
values, but it is voluntary compliance with the threat of conversion of a practice
into a legal requirement in a future lawsuit.
283 For additional suggestions about how the companies could apply due process to users, see
MICHAELS, supra note 81, at 7.
284 For example, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) launched in 2008 to bring together companies,
academics, civil society organizations, and investors to address issues regarding how companies handle
government demands that impact users’ privacy and freedom of expression. See MACKINNON, supra note
18, at 179-81 (describing GNI’s founding); see also GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, GNI PRINCIPLES ON
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY (2017), https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gin_tnetnoc/
uploads/2018/04/GNI-Principles-on-Freedom-of-Expression-and-Privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6NJ6-K2JK]; Portfolio, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/
index.php [https://perma.cc/S5QT-S7TR] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (listing corporate, academic, civil society,
and investor participants). For critiques of GNI, see, for example, Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 38 (2011), which notes four critiques, including the likelihood that many companies will not
join and that the voluntary commitments will fail in the face of government imposed legal requirements.
285 U.S. National Security Orders Report, supra note 274.
286 Environmental Sustainability, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporateresponsibility/environmental-sustainability [https://perma.cc/Z2WW-CN58] (last visited Feb. 8,
2019); Human Rights, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/
human-rights [https://perma.cc/27CL-CZ6R] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
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In recent articles, scholars have proposed different means of imposing
broad-based legal regulation on the companies in ways that would serve at least
some public-law values. For example, Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain have
proposed making online service providers “information ﬁduciaries.”287 While
traditional ﬁduciaries owe duties of care and loyalty to their clients,288 Balkin
posits that the exact nature of the duties imposed on online service providers
should vary based on the nature of their business.289 The information
ﬁduciary status could arise through direct imposition of legal regulations
establishing the ﬁduciary duties or legal incentives, like “tax breaks, safe
harbors, [or] legal immunities” to entice companies to self-designate as
information ﬁduciaries.290 K. Sabeel Rahman, on the other hand, has
proposed regulating “online-enabled infrastructure,” including Google,
Facebook, and Amazon, as public utilities.291 He envisions a range of possible
regulations, for example, to prohibit discrimination or require the companies
to act consistent with common carrier duties.292
While there is much to recommend these proposals as controls on the
relationship between companies and users, it is far less clear that they could
287 See Balkin, supra note 206, at 1209 (defining an “information fiduciary” as “a person or business
who, because of their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with respect to the information
they obtain in the course of their relationship”); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to
Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/W6MB-ZXNG] (discussing why and
how to make online platforms information ﬁduciaries); see also Balkin, supra note 206, at 1223-24
(setting out three criteria for determining when a business is an information ﬁduciary).
288 Balkin, supra note 206, at 1207-08.
289 Id. at 1229.
290 Id.; see also Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for [https://perma.cc/
W233-C7Q6] (arguing that “[i]deally, companies would become fiduciaries by choice, instead of by legal
mandate” in response to, for example, “U.S. federal law offering relief from the existing requirements of
individual states if companies opt in to fiduciary status”); Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an
Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/
117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/XRQ4-AR2C]
(proposing that to incentivize online platforms to become information ﬁduciaries, “the government
could oﬀer tax breaks or certain legal immunities for those [companies] willing to step up toward an
enhanced duty to their users”).
291 Rahman, supra note 2, at 1669, 1672; see also GANESH SITARAMAN, GREAT DEMOCRACY
INITIATIVE, REGULATING TECH PLATFORMS: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 5-6 (2018),
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Regulating-Tech-Platforms-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM2J-V9H4] (discussing how to adapt traditional public utilities regulations to
Internet platforms). But see BALKIN, supra note 83, at 7 (criticizing proposals for regulating social
media companies as public utilities); Peter Swire, Should the Leading Online Tech Companies Be
Regulated as Public Utilities?, LAWFARE (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
should-leading-online-tech-companies-be-regulated-public-utilities [https://perma.cc/7T3U-LSVP]
(discussing arguments in favor of regulating tech companies as public utilities but also highlighting
reasons the public utility model is problematic).
292 Rahman, supra note 2, at 1674, 1677.
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eﬀectively address the relationship between companies and governments that
the Digital Switzerlands concept primarily addresses.293 For the many
problems stemming from how companies beneﬁt from and exploit user data,
the prospect of regulation is in some ways a classic type of ﬁx: government
oﬃcials looking down upon the problematic actions of the companies can step
in to impose limits on what companies can do to users. But what happens
when the government itself is a threat to users? In that circumstance,
government regulation is a far less attractive solution.
It is both less plausible as a descriptive matter and less desirable as a
normative matter to craft regulations that empower companies to check the
government. Crafting regulations that would require the companies to act for
the beneﬁt of users, even against the government, could well be antithetical
to the interests of (at least some powerful parts of) the government.294
Consider Microsoft or Google bolstered by a ﬁduciary duty of care and
loyalty toward their users that they understand to legally obligate them to
challenge government requests for information, resist government pushes to
bypass product security features, and disclose the maximum possible amount
of information about government information requests. A legal obligation to
defend public-law values would make the companies more of a thorn in the
side of governments. Government actors—at least executive branch
oﬃcials—then have diminished incentives to support proposals to obligate
companies to act as Digital Switzerlands.
But government regulation could take another, more objectionable form.
Allowing the government to define how companies should protect user interests
in the government-versus-user context could well become the vehicle not for
empowering the companies to defend users, but for undermining their ability to
do so effectively. Think of a regulation requiring backdoors to compromise
encryption. In other words, putting the government in a position to regulate the
company–government relationship is likely to result (unsurprisingly) in
regulations that favor the government’s interests, rather than regulations that
strengthen companies’ ability to robustly check the government.
Any legislative eﬀort to impose generalized regulatory schemes to
mandate consumer protection against governments would likely face
opposition from the companies as well. The regulations would no doubt be
somewhat burdensome, and being legally required to take actions to defend

293 As currently formulated, I do not understand the extant regulatory proposals to reach the
issues that this Article primarily addresses, and, as this Section explains, for good reason.
294 Cf. Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 40-41 (2016)
(arguing that corporate promises to resist government demands for information are unlikely to be
eﬀective because “the same government that is asking for the data” is responsible for enforcing and
is thus unlikely to enforce the promise).
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users against the government would take away the marketing value of the
companies’ current willingness to undertake such actions.
Regulation to protect against government action is even less likely now in
the United States where any proposals that require legislative action fall
subject to the paralysis and gridlock that characterize the political branches
of the federal government. With a President determined to dismantle the
regulatory state,295 putting faith in the prospect of new regulation as a
generalized solution is a dicey proposition—and all the more so when
regulation would empower companies to resist the government.
On the other hand, specialized regulatory requirements may be more
likely, especially when addressed to the behavior of foreign governments.
Limiting other governments does not produce the same disincentives involved
in expecting the U.S. Congress and President to check the U.S. government.
One example is a pending congressional bill, the Honest Ads Act, which would
require Internet companies to disclose the purchasers of online political ads.296
The bill is a direct reaction to the disclosures about Russian purchases of
advertising on Internet platforms to influence the 2016 election.297 Imposition
of targeted regulation, or even threats of such regulation, can play a useful role
in mitigating the risks of passivity that can attend a posture of neutrality,298
and it would serve the public values of transparency and accountability.299 To
date, several tech companies have announced their support for the bill,300 and
See, e.g., JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 13 (2017) (“[President Trump] pays no fealty to the State. Quite the
opposite: he promised to ‘drain the swamp,’ meaning the Washington bureaucracy . . . .”).
296 Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Kenneth P. Vogel & Cecilia Kang,
Senators Demand Online Ad Disclosures as Tech Lobby Mobilizes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/us/politics/facebook-google-russia-meddling-disclosure.html
(describing the Honest Ads Act).
297 See Vogel & Kang, supra note 296 (“[I]n the run-up to the 2016 election, Facebook sold more
than $100,000 worth of ads to a Russian company linked to the Kremlin, while Google sold at least $4,700
worth of ads to accounts believed to be connected to the Russian government.”); see also Election Hearings,
supra note 222, at 30-31 (statement of Sean J. Edgett, Acting Gen. Counsel, Twitter, Inc.) (discussing ad
purchases on Twitter); id. at 12-14 (statement of Colin Stretch, Gen. Counsel, Facebook) (describing
Internet Research Agency ad purchases and impact on Facebook); id. at 43 (statement of Kent Walker,
Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Google) (describing ad purchases on Google-owned sites); Elliot
Schrage, Hard Questions: Russian Ads Delivered to Congress, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/hard-questions-russian-ads-delivered-to-congress [https://perma.cc/
6QMT-Y8SM] (reporting ad spending and impressions).
298 See supra notes 195–98 (discussing how neutrality can foster passivity).
299 Imposition of such targeted regulations somewhat ironically bolsters neutrality, while at the
same time highlighting the continued subordination of the companies to national government regulators,
and thus challenging the other prong of the Digital Switzerlands analogy—the claim to parity with states.
300 See Tom Burt, Announcing the Defending Democracy Program, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON
THE ISSUES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/04/13/announcing-thedefending-democracy-program [https://perma.cc/5EEH-9EVC] (announcing Microsoft’s support
for the Honest Ads Act); Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/
295
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for good reason: support is consistent with the model described above whereby
the companies will generally not oppose a government’s actions where the
government is clearly allied with users.301
In the medium term, then, the most promising avenues for getting the
companies to abide by public-law values are those that are already bearing
some fruit. Competitive pressures, corporate social responsibility norms,
evolving industry standards, and threats of targeted regulation are imperfect
mechanisms, but they are feasible avenues of progress.
D. Stability and Sustainability
Finally, companies’ willingness to play the role of “Digital Switzerlands”
may be highly contingent. There is currently business value in championing
privacy, defending users against governments, and announcing neutrality
between territorial governments.302 But circumstances may shift, as they have
in the past, and companies may come to see greater advantages in alliances
with governments, instead of neutrality, and in cooperation, rather than
resistance.303 Thus, the question becomes if there is value in having
technology companies be or at least aspire to be Digital Switzerlands, how
can their role be stabilized to prevent backsliding?
The companies’ willingness to play the Digital Switzerlands role seems to
depend, as argued in Section II.C, on the relative positions of users and
governments. The companies appear willing to resist governments when they have
viable legal arguments and can plausibly claim to be on the side of users against
governments. One major threat to the stability of the Digital Switzerlands model
would be a shift among users toward alignment with governments. Such a shift
might be driven by an exogenous shock, like a significant terrorist attack or frequent
lower-level terrorist attacks. Users might react to exogenous shocks by exhibiting
greater tolerance for government requests, for example, to access encrypted
communications or to surveil the content of user accounts. Though often described
as a tradeoff between privacy and security, it is more accurate to say that users might
alter their security–security tradeoff—shifting from concern about security from
governments to greater concern about the security of governments in the sense that
those governments provide physical protection to their people. User concern about
government surveillance could also dissipate not with a bang, but with a whimper,
zuck/posts/10104784125525891 [https://perma.cc/KM4E-AG9J] (announcing that Facebook supports
passage of the Honest Ads Act).
301 See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
302 Cf. SCHNEIER, supra note 44, at 207; Calo, supra note 294, at 39 (“[T]he Snowden
revelations and subsequent global reaction to the NSA’s spying capabilities have invigorated privacy
as a competitive diﬀerentiator.”).
303 See, e.g., infra notes 316–17 and accompanying text.
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embracing fatalism about ubiquitous surveillance and monitoring. In that
circumstance, companies may see little value in resisting governments.304
Another type of exogenous shock could be significantly increased pressure
on the companies by governments around the world.305 Such pressure might
be spurred, for example, by perceived threats to the ruling regime or periods
of particular sensitivity to users’ critiques of the government.306 Increased
government pressure could manifest in different ways, including, for example,
threats to ban companies’ products, embroil the companies in costly legal
proceedings, use competition law to break up the companies, or take action
against the companies’ assets or personnel in a country unless the companies
cease challenging the government. These scenarios are not farfetched.
Authorities in countries like Brazil and Italy have arrested company executives
for failing to comply with government requests or orders.307 This type of
exogenous shock does not depend on a shift in the position of users, but rather
because it would increase the costs to companies of continuing to resist
governments, it could cause companies to behave differently—that is, to cease
resistance and cooperate with governments. Such a choice would be a violation
of the Digital Switzerlands model, but if time limited and geographically
limited, some number of deviations would not cause the model’s collapse.
Assuming the model is vulnerable to various exogenous shocks, what can
be done to reinforce and entrench it?
304 Such a movement may be underway with respect to government-directed content controls.
See, e.g., Manjoo, supra note 214 (noting, in discussing Google’s reported plan to relaunch a censored
search engine in China, that many governments now engage in content controls and that companies
like Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft already do business in China).
305 Increased government pressure could be the result of either endogenous or exogenous
reasons. On the endogenous side, governments might increase pressure on companies in response
to a shift in position of users away from companies and toward the governments. That shift is
endogenous to the model described in Section II.C. This paragraph focuses instead on exogenous
reasons that government pressure might increase.
306 See, e.g., Jonathan Kaiman, China Cracks Down on Dissent Ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary,
G UARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 11:50 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/
china-cracks-down-dissent-tiananmen-anniversary [https://perma.cc/5EV4-E33Q] (detailing Chinese
government crackdowns surrounding the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary of Tiananmen Square).
307 See, e.g., RONALD J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE
DARK SIDE OF THE INTERNET 109 (2013) (discussing arrests of a Google official in Brazil and
charges against Google executives in Italy relating to Google’s failure to remove videos from its
services); see also Jonathan Watts, Brazilian Police Arrest Facebook’s Latin America Vice-President,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:35 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/01/
brazil-police-arrest-facebook-latin-america-vice-president-diego-dzodan [https://perma.cc/478U-5RML]
(reporting that a Facebook executive was arrested in Brazil for questioning regarding Facebook
subsidiary WhatsApp’s alleged noncompliance with a court order requiring disclosure of user
communications, which the company avers that it does not store); Jacob Kastrenakes, Brazil Orders
Release of Facebook Executive Arrested in WhatsApp Dispute, VERGE (Mar. 2, 2016, 9:40 AM EST),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/2/11145494/facebook-vp-being-released-brazil-whatsapp-dispute
[https://perma.cc/TF2A-MLCN] (reporting that the Facebook executive was released a day after his arrest).
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One means to drive entrenchment is transparency. The transparency
reports that companies issue about government requests for content enable
at least some oversight and monitoring of government actions and of the
companies’ reactions. Although publication of the reports is entirely
voluntary, various pressures have pushed companies toward publication and
similarly militate against cessation of the practice. Some of the pressure
comes from competitors: publishing transparency reports has become an
industry standard.308 Amazon, which was comparatively slow to begin
publishing transparency reports,309 received criticism for failing to do so.310
Civil society groups also exert pressure on the companies. For example,
since 2011,311 the Electronic Frontier Foundation has published an annual
report entitled Who Has Your Back? that tracks and compares the performance
of technology companies across a variety of metrics, including disclosing
government data requests to users, resisting government gag orders
prohibiting disclosure, and following industry-wide best practices, including
publication of transparency reports.312 In a recent report, Amazon and
WhatsApp received particular criticism among technology companies, and
earned only two out of ﬁve possible “stars,” due to failures to, for example,
commit to notifying users of government data requests.313
Consumers and investors can also pressure companies to maintain strong
security practices and challenge government demands with respect to users.
Civil society groups’ monitoring of companies’ practices—a naming and
shaming mechanism—fosters the ability of informed consumers and investors
308 See, e.g., Lucy Schouten, How Google Became a Champion for Government Transparency,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 19, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/0719/
How-Google-became-a-champion-for-government-transparency (publishing transparency reports
has “become an all-but-expected practice among major technologies with a Fortune 500 ranking”).
309 Amazon issued its ﬁrst transparency report in June 2015. Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon Discloses
Transparency Report for First Time, CNET (June 12, 2015, 7:07 PM PDT), https://www.cnet.com/
news/amazon-discloses-transparency-report-for-first-time.
310 See, e.g., Taylor Soper, ACLU Technologist: A
‘ mazon Has Escaped the Transparency Spotlight’,
GEEKWIRE (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2015/prominent-aclu-technologistchris-soghoian-amazon-has-escaped-the-transparency-spotlight [https://perma.cc/GKK8-LW3K]
(reporting ACLU Principal Technologist Chris Soghoian’s public criticism of Amazon for failing to
publish transparency reports); Zack Whittaker, Amazon Doesn’t Want You to Know How Many Data
Demands It Gets, ZDNET (Mar. 19, 2015, 10:34 PDT), http://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-dot-comthe-tech-master-of-secrecy [https://perma.cc/LHR3-87GT] (criticizing Amazon’s failure to publish
transparency reports).
311 For the first report, published in 2011, see When the Government Comes Knocking, Who Has Your
Back?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2011 [https://perma.cc/
MFG2-VSY9] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
312 See NATE CARDOZO ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? 2017, at 9-11
(2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/07/08/whohasyourback_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2JK-JJUC]
(detailing rating criteria).
313 See id. at 6, 8.
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to vote with their feet, choosing service and product providers and potential
investment options at least partly based on their security practices.
Consumers and investors in the aggregate have the potential to reward and
punish companies in the market based on the public stances they take.
Another source of entrenchment of the Digital Switzerlands role could
potentially come from governments themselves. This may seem paradoxical.
After all, government behavior is monitored incidentally through the
companies’ transparency policies and checked by the companies’ challenges.
Nonetheless, it is possible to envision a very privacy protective (probably
European) government that might be concerned about protecting its citizens
against foreign governments. Such a government could, for example, mandate
publication of transparency reports, transforming what is currently a
voluntary practice into a legal requirement. Such a regulation, of course,
might raise questions about the extent to which one country could mandate
disclosure of government requests or orders worldwide, as opposed to just
those requested by its own government or by all governments with respect to
its own citizens. A legal mandate for publication of transparency reports could
bolster companies’ legal position vis-à-vis governments in other countries
that might seek to restrict publication of government request information.
All of these mechanisms may help to entrench the Digital Switzerlands
model, but they are fragile and incomplete. The model remains vulnerable to
shocks that could reshape the relationship between users, governments, and
technology companies.
CONCLUSION
Considering the potential role of U.S. technology companies as Digital
Switzerlands reveals several insights, some speciﬁc to the current situation
and others more generalizable.
The Digital Switzerlands concept is aspirational and may remain that way.
With the exception of Denmark’s dispatch of a digital ambassador to the
companies,314 states do not regard the companies as peers, and the companies
lack the territory and monopolization of the use of violence within territory
that are required for statehood. But they have attained some measures of
power comparable to states, and they continue—in circumstances of their
choosing—to resist governments, and to do so successfully in many cases.
For technology users, the companies are powerful regulators, but also powerful
defenses against government regulators. Dual sovereignties may ultimately help
to protect users from governments. But in accepting dual sovereigns, it is
important to critically evaluate the corporate supplemental sovereigns, which lack
314

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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most of the traditional aspects of democracy that legitimize governments. The
companies gain some legitimacy in other ways, including responsiveness to a
community of worldwide “constituents,” the constant threat by users to exit,
defecting to other corporate “sovereigns,” and voluntarily undertaking to abide by
some public-law values. These features help lend some legitimacy to the
companies for the limited purpose of serving as counterweights to traditional
governmental sovereigns, but they remain fundamentally undemocratic.
Moreover, embracing the Digital Switzerlands concept may strengthen the
companies’ will and capacity to resist government regulation of the companies’
power over their users—a power that has many troubling aspects.315 The
companies’ rising power to counter governments, in other words, may affect
their power over users. As the companies’ overall power increases, the power
of governments over them may decrease, including when it comes to
regulating the companies’ treatment of users and user data. While it is still too
soon to know definitively how the Digital Switzerlands concept will influence
the companies’ relationship to governments and users, companies’ parity with
governments on one plane of interaction may ultimately affect others.
At the same time, the companies’ embrace of actions consistent with the
Digital Switzerlands idea is fragile. The Digital Switzerlands concept is the
latest evolution in the companies’ role with respect to governments—a role
that has changed considerably even in the last decade. The evolution suggests
that the likelihood of change is perhaps the most stable feature. And the issue
that may cause the companies to abandon pursuit of neutrality may already be
on the horizon: companies are taking divergent positions on sales of artificial
intelligence and other advanced technologies to nation-state militaries.316 Such
sales would not themselves necessarily violate neutrality, which merely
suggests treating states equally. But treating states equally by selling to no
militaries may be untenable as a business proposition, whereas treating states
equally by selling to all militaries raises serious questions of security and
human rights. The need or desire to differentiate between military customers
may cause the companies to align themselves with their national government
and allied governments in ways that they have avoided so far.317
Still, the U.S. technology companies’ current pursuit of a posture of
neutrality as between governments is a new development in the history of
powerful companies. Although it is an imperfect neutrality given the
companies’ ongoing association with the United States, the Digital

See supra note 6 (discussing concerns with the company–user relationship and collecting sources).
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the companies’ diverging positions on
sales to the U.S. military).
317 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (discussing how the tech companies so far
diﬀer from traditional military contractors).
315
316
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Switzerlands concept nonetheless suggests a diﬀerent kind of role private
actors can play: denationalized, global, powerful due to mass appeal to
individuals, and willing to stand up to traditional territorial sovereigns in the
name of the users that are necessary to maintain the companies’ power. Even
if the Digital Switzerlands model ultimately breaks down for the U.S.
technology companies, a similar model might arise with other companies or
other sectors in the future. Industries that have global user bases, tight ties to
(nongovernmental) customers, and signiﬁcant resources could ultimately
stand as new “Switzerlands,” whether digital or not.

